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Certification: A Practical Device for Early
Screening of Spurious Antitrust Litigation
W. Cole Durham, Jr. * and Jonathan A. Dibble**
Cognizant of the growing need to provide responsible guidance in the discovery process to prevent abuses in complex cases,
federal district courts in two pending antitrust cases1 have employed an innovative certification procedure to help focus issues
and assure that discovery does not impose wasteful costs on the
par tie^.^ Briefly stated, the procedure stays discovery in appropriate cases3 until the party asserting the claim files a certificate
specifying a factual basis for concluding first, that the claim is
brought in good faith, and second, that there is sufficient likeli.~
of certain tensions such
hood discovery will be f r ~ i t f u lBecause
a procedure creates with regard to the general philosophy of liberal discovery and notice pleading pervading the Federal Rules of
, ~is bound to be controversial if applied more
Civil P r ~ c e d u r eit
widely. However, while nowhere near as extensive in its ramifications as the key proposals for discovery reform currently being
advanced by the American Bar Association and the Judicial Conference of the United state^,^ discovery certification remains an
* Assistant Professor of Law, J . Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. A.B., 1972, Harvard University; J.D., 1975, Harvard Law School.
** B.A., 1970, University of Utah; J.D., 1973, Stanford Law School. Member, California and Utah State Bars.
1. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, filed
Mar. 23, 1977); Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D.
Ore., filed Aug. 6, 1971).
2. For convenience, and because this procedure requires certification as a precondition for obtaining normal discovery, it will be useful t o refer to this device as "discovery
certification."
3. See notes 203-10 and accompanying text infra.
4. For a more detailed description of the procedure, see notes 51-61 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 138-79 and accompanying text infra.
6. In the aftermath of the Pound Conference held two years ago, see generally 70
F.R.D. 79 (1976), the ABA Section of Litigation has presented a series of proposals which
would narrow the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(l) from the "subject matter" to the
"issues" involved in an action and woulcfmake a number of minor modifications in the
COMrules which would reduce discovery expense in certain circumstances. See SPECIAL
MITTEE FOR THE STUDY
OF DISCOVERY
ABUSE,SECTIONOF LITIGATION
OF THE AMERICAN
BAR
ASS'N; REPORT
(2d printing and rev. 1977); Lundquist & Schechter, The New Relevancy:
An End to Trial by Ordeal, 64 A.B.A.J. 59, 59-60 (1978); Lamm, Department of Justice
NEWS,April 1978, a t
Endorses Discovery Rule Changes Proposed by Section, LITIGATION
1. Following up on this proposal, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
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attractive procedural device because of its flexibility and utility
in curbing abuses at the very outset of the discovery process.
Although it is still too early to evaluate the discovery certification device comprehensively, the procedure clearly warrants
careful examination. Accordingly, after identifying some of the
potential abuses which create the need for such a procedure,' this
Article will analyze the possible bases for a certification order
within the Federal Rules8 and within the inherent power of district court^.^ Next, we will examine limitations on the availability
of certification in view of the liberal pleading and discovery notions of the Federal Rules.lo Finally, the sanctions available to
assure effective implementation of a certification procedure will
be explored. While the certification device might ultimately
prove to be useful in managing many types of complex litigation,
our analysis will focus primarily on its use in the antitrust area
since that is the area in which the device first evolved and in
which its possible applications are most apparent.

Forty years of experience under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have established beyond peradventure the value of
discovery as a potent tool for advancing the interests of justice in
the vast majority of cases. In recent years, however, various
abuses of the discovery procedures have attracted increasing attention and concern. Chief Justice Burger echoed a mounting
refrain in his keynote address at the Pound Conference in 1976
when he stated:
the Judicial Conference has circulated a preliminary draft of proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dated March 1978. While this draft varies from the ABA
proposal in some respects, most notably in not explicitly limiting the scope of discovery
to "issues," it endorses the suggestion of eliminating the phrase from Rule 26(b)(l) which
suggests that parties may discover anything relevant to the "subject matter involved in
the pending action." It also follows the recommendation of establishing a discovery conference, available as a matter of right in appropriate cases, to' facilitate more efficient and
ON RULESOF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
OF THE JUDICIAL
better focused discovery. COMMI'ITEE
CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITEDSTATES,PRELIMINARY
D m OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS
TO THE
FEDERAL
RULESOF CIVILPROCEDURE
6-11 (March 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 PROPOSED
reprinted in 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978). While i t is still too early to predict the
AMENDMENTS],
impact the proposed changes would have--assuming they are adopted in some form-they
would no doubt be considerably more far reaching in their effects than the certification
procedure outlined in this Article.
7. See notes 12-30 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 62-179 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 180-202 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 203-10 and accompanying text infra. Also see notes 137-79and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 211-34 and accompanying text infra.
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Increasingly in the past 20 years, responsible lawyers have
pointed to abuses of the pretrial processes in civil cases. The
complaint is that misuse of pretrial procedures means that "the
case must be tried twice." The responsibility for correcting this
lies with lawyers and judges, for the cure is in our hands.12

The problem of abuse has become particularly acute in the
antitrust area where cases typically involve numerous parties,
complex issues, and voluminous discovery. The seriousness of the
problem is underscored by the realization that pretrial is increasingly becoming 'the determinative phase of antitrust litigation .I3
Discovery is almost always burdensome and in the larger cases
can be truly staggering. A typical case may necessikate hundreds
of depositions and may involve thousands, if not millions, of documents.14 Wily attorneys have developed techniques for propounding literally thousands of questions by using a few carefully
subdivided and cross-referenced interrogatories.15Expanded use
of the class action device in the antitrust area over the past
decadel%as further multiplied potential discovery burdens?' The
12. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D.
83, 95-96 (1976).
13. See Withrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor,
62 CORNELL
L. REV.1, 5, 7-9 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 203 (1976). One of the major computer industry cases, Honeywell,
Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1974-1Trade Cas. (CCH) 7 74,874 (D. Minn. 1973), involved
over 30,000 marked exhibits, some 71 live and 80 canned witnesses, and over 20,000 pages
of transcript at trial alone. See Withrow & Larm, supra note 13, a t 37. Presumably, the
quantities of information involved a t the discovery stage were even more staggering.
The use of computers in large antitrust cases for storage of information and documents is becoming increasingly common. See Arthur, The Computer and the Practice of
Law: Litigation Support, 63 A.B.A.J. 1737, 1737-40 (1977). This adds another dimension
to discovery costs. A recent LEXIS sales brochure indicates that the first-year cost of
converting 8,000 letters averaging one page apiece into computer readable form and making them available for research in LEXIS (i.e., the cost of keystroking, loading, and
storage) is $15,600. Storage costs in subsequent years would be approximately 18 cents
COMPUTER
ASSISTANCE
IN LITIGATION:
A LAWYER'S
GUIDE
9
per page. MEADDATACENTRAL,
(undated). In a large case this could easily run into hundreds of thousands of dollars, not
including the cost of computer time once the information is stored. Of course, the decision
to computerize a document depository would reflect a business judgment that computerization would ultimately be less expensive than some other form of document management, but the expense is nonetheless very high.
15. See McElroy, Federal Pre-Trial Procedure in an Antitrust Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649,
682 (1977).
16. See Withrow & Larm, supra note 13, a t 4.
17. Other examples of discovery abuse include demands for nationwide discovery in
local or regional cases, requests for documents and interrogatories which cover excessive
time periods, inquiries which range too widely into the business and records of subsidiaries
and divisions, and other types of dragnet demands. Byrnes, Discovery: Its Uses and
Abuses-The Defendants' Perspective, 44 ANTITRUST
L.J. 14,24-25 (1975); McElroy, supra
note 15, at 682. See also Blecher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintiff's
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growing tendency to use discovery as a bludgeon has elicited cries
of "legalized b l a ~ k m a i l . "The
~ ~ gargantuan economic costs of discovery are further compounded by less tangible injuries in the
form of invasion of privacy and psychological disruption of an
ongoing economic enterprise." In view of the exploding volume of
information involved in the discovery phase of large cases, Judge
Renfrew has aptly characterized the procedural transformation
wrought by the federal rules as a shift from "trial by ambush" to
"trial by avalanche. " ~ 0
One of the most deeply troubling perversions of the discovery
process involves using the threat of expensive discovery costs to
extort substantial settlements from innocent defendant^.^' The
Supreme Court adverted to this problem in Blue Chips Stamps
u. Manor Drug Stores.22After noting that extensive and liberal
discovery of evidence relevant to determining the merits of a
claim is to be encouraged, the Court observed:
[TI0 the extent that [discovery] permits a plaintiff with a
largely groundless claim to simply take up the time of a number
of other people, with the right to do so representing an in
terrorern increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost rather than a benefit.23

The threat of expensive discovery is particularly acute for the
small company swept into the large antitrust case as a codefendant. Facing the risk of joint and several liability that may vastly
exceed the total worth of the enterprise, as well as a minimum of
several thousand dollars in litigation expenses during the early
discovery phase alone, a small company may be driven to settle
no matter how sincere its belief that it is innocent.24An unscrupulous plaintiff can take advantage of this situation by joining a
large number of defendants, settling with the "smaller fish" for
a sum which is substantial but less than the projected costs of
Viewpoint), 55 F.R.D. 365, 365-68 (1972); Malina, The Search for the Pot of Gold, 41
Tool or Engine of
Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 378, 389-91 (1972).
18. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
L.REV.1, 9 (1971).
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM.
19. See, e.g., Kirkham, supra note 14, at 203.
20. Renfrew, Panel Discussion: Discovery in Civil Antitrust Suits, 44 ANTITRUST L.J.
57, 59 (1975).
21. See Bymes, supra note 17, at 25.
22. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
23. Id. at 741.
24. Kirkham, supra note 14, at 207.

ANTITRUSTL.J. 301, 320 (1972); Simon, Class Actions-Useful
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defending the action through the early discovery phase, thus
building a "war chest" to go after larger targets.
In order to more clearly delineate the dimensions of this
problem, it will be useful to identify a number of potential sources
of expense in early antitrust discovery. The figures in the table
on the following page are based on conservative estimates and
assumptions extrapolated from actual experience with a number
of actual cases.
Despite conscientious efforts to achieve an elusive Aristotelian balance between being analytically thorough and maintaining a minimal cost for the client, the defense of a complex
action will precipitate substantial costs even in the very early
phases of litigation. An antitrust case, because of the combined
exposure to large prayers, treble damages, attorneys' fees, injunctive relief, related subsequent actions, and, in some instances,
possible criminal sanctions, usually requires a team of two to
three attorneys. If the action is brought in an area removed from
the larger metropolitan cities, two law firms will probably be
retained: the antitrust specialists and the litigating firm admitted before the bar of the forum state.
The accompanying table gives a breakdown of the approximate attorneys hours involved in the early stages of an antitrust
case, assuming the involvement of two law firms for the defendant.
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TABLE- Estimated Attorney Hours
in Initial Stages of Litigation pe.r Def endccnt
Partner
Hours

Associate
Hours

Review of complaint and file
Initial discussions with client's executives
Law firm strategy mapping
Industry and company background discussion
with lawyers and employees
Analysis of possible motions to dismiss;
further consultation with client; legal research
Preparation and filing of answer to complaint
Preparation and filing of counter-claim
Drafting of first set of interrogatories;'"
request for production of documents
Conversations, conferences, correspondence between
opposing counsel for discovery scheduling,
stipulations, extensions of time, etc.
Preparation of answers to plaintiff's interrogatories;
review of answers with client's employees; review
and production of defendant's documents for
plaintiff's inspection; inspection of plaintiff's
documents
Analysis of possible further motions to dismiss or for
summary judgment; legal research
Data gathering by means of interview,
affidavit, or deposition26
Compelling complete discovery-communications with
plaintiff's counsel, Rule 37 motion, legal research27
Preparation, filing, and implementing of protective
orders for sensitive competitive information
Total attorney time

25. Defendants7first set of interrogatoriesare often aimed at ferreting out the "facts"
upon which the allegations in the complaint are based.
26. Hours given include the time expended in preparing for and taking the deposition
of one person for one day, assuming that a partner from each law firm spends eight hours
at the deposition and seven hours in witness preparation, and that associates from both
firms are involved in culling documents, outlining the areas of examination, and otherwise
laying the groundwork for the deposition.
Since a complex case would probably require many depositions over many days,
actual expense in this category could be much greater. Depositions would also include
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Assuming conser~atively~~
that counsel, with a reputation of competence to deal with complex litigation, can be retained a t an
hourly rate of $50 per hour for an associate's time and $75 per
hour for a partner's or senior litigator's time, attorney billings
alone would amount to $6,000 for partners' hours and $9,750 for
associates' hours. In addition, the client must pay paralegal costs
for examining and culling documents often stored in massive
numbers in warehouses. Duplicating costs, long distance telephone bills, and travel expenses also increase the burden. These
expenses could easily exceed $5,000 within the first several weeks.
Thus, a defendant in a complex, multiparty case might expect to
spend well over $20,000 during the initial stages of litigati~n,~'
and this figure would increase dramatically as more depositions
were taken.
This estimate of expenses does not include the defendant's
own internal costs, such as time spent by in-house counsel and
other employees in connection with the lawsuit. In addition,
many costs associated with the defense of complex litigation are
not easily quantified. Diversion or preoccupation of key company
executives and other employees may take a significant toll in
terms of both time and morale. Another unquantifiable cost is the
possible adverse impact of the suit on the firm's public relations.
The above expenses represent the initial costs incurred prior
to the stage where unmeritorious pleadings can be disposed of by
a motion for summary judgment. Although the stated expenses
are in a sense arbitrary in that they are not based on a large
--

- --

court reporter costs which typically involves a minimum of $25 per first hour and $10 per
hour thereafter, $1.75 per page for the original and one copy, and $0.25 per page for each
extra copy.
27. Some of these expenses may be reversed if the judge awards costs; often, however,
the court only compels discovery.
28. An idea of just how conservative our figures are can be obtained by comparing
the fees recently awarded in the sugar industry antitrust litigation. See generally In re
Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. MDL-201 (N.D. Cal., May 10, 1978)
(opinion and order regarding attorneys fees). The fees awarded the various attorneys
ranged from $40 to $175 per hour, with most of the fees awarded to the more experienced
attorneys ranging between $100 and $125 per hour and fees for associates averaging about
$65 per hour.
29. On the other hand, if a complaint seeks temporary or preliminary injunctive
relief, initial discovery costs escalate dramatically because a tremendous amount of evidence in affidavits and live testimony must be discovered, digested, and related to the
finder of fact in a relatively short period of time. And, these costs must still be multiplied
by the number of defendants to give a n idea of the total defense costs involved. It may
well be that the defendants can, through a joint defense committee, avoid the duplication
of some of these costs and thereby reduce the burden on each defendant. If the complaint
involves antitrust allegations, however, each defendant must cautiously avoid any appearance of concerted action.
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sample of empirical data, they reflect averages drawn from actual
cases and have been conservatively reduced. And, for purposes of
this Article, it is irrelevant whether the figures accurately reflect
the actual expenditures in any one case or group of cases. Their
principal purpose is purely to illustrate the potential discovery
costs defendants may incur in complex litigation. Once a defendant focuses on the costs associated with participation in a lawsuit, any lesser amount can serve as a starting point for early
settlement discussions.
By thoroughly invoking the process of discovery, the plaintiff
can possibly find enough evidence to establish a jury issue, and
in any event can immediately boost the amount of a "nuisance
value" settlement from the defendants. By pulling everyone in an
industry into a complex lawsuit dragnet-style and then selling
peace for a price below the costs of defending the lawsuit, the
plaintiff can often secure early settlements, thereby augmenting
its "war chestW3Owhile simultaneously narrowing the number of
parties and reducing its prosecution costs. In this setting, the
pragmatic business man is faced with the dilemma of either investing in a fight to protect his honor or capitulating to save
litigation expenses. Confronted with such a choice, companies
may well decide to pay a nuisance value settlement rather than
face an irate board of directors later if the legal expenses escalate
or the lawsuit is lost.
A system which tolerates such extortionlike pressures is unjust to innocent defendants in unmeritorious actions and may be
unfair to plaintiffs and contrary to the public interest in some
meritorious suits. If a real culprit escapes a lawsuit by slipping
through the net while the confused fisherman sorts the smelt from
the salmon, society as a whole suffers. Requiring the plaintiffs to
meet an initial threshold burden through discovery certification
might prevent such injustices and help litigants and the courts
focus on the real issues and parties in interest.
30. A quick rule of thumb would place such settlements anywhere below the early
costs of defending the lawsuit, as suggested by the following diagram:

Minimum settlement acceptable
to plaintiff

<

"War chest"
settlements

<

Early costs of
discovery

The minimum settlement acceptable for plaintiff would normally approximate his expenses per defendant or the plaintiff might set an arbitrary minimum so as to "save face."
A minimum value settlement of $5,000 from 20 of the 28 defendants in Mountain View
would give plaintiffs a $100,000 "war chest."
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As indicated at the outset, we are aware of only two cases in
which a discovery certification procedure has been invokedPortland Retail Druggists Association v. Abbott Lab~ratories,~'
and Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott L a b o r a t ~ r i e s Both
.~~
cases involve nebulous antitrust claims brought against several
major pharmaceutical companies, and the complaint in the
Mountain View case was apparently modeled on the amended
complaint in Portland Retail druggist^.^^ Before proceeding to
a brief description of the manner in which a certification procedure would operate and an analysis of the potential value of
this device in alleviating the problems discussed in the previous
Section, it will be useful to describe these two cases in some
detail.

A.

The Case Law Background

The complaint originally filed in Portland Retail Druggists
asserted five separate causes of action. The first four were
Robinson-Patman Act claims and the fifth alleged a conspiracy
claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The first certification
order was issued on January 12, 1972, and required the plaintiffs
to provide "a certificate showing that they currently have information from which the Court can conclude that it is reasonably
probable that discovery on the merits will produce evidence sufficient to establish each cause of action."34A certificate to this end
was subsequently filed. Thereafter, the case was assigned to a
second judge who dismissed two of the causes of action35and
allowed discovery to go forward on the claim involving discriminatory sales to nonprofit institution^.^' After final resolution of
that portion of the case by the United States Supreme C ~ u r t , ~ '
31. No. 71-543 (D. Ore., filed Aug. 6, 1971).
32. No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, filed Mar. 23, 1977).
33. The original complaint in Mountain View was in many respects a verbatim copy
of the amended complaint in Portland Retail Druggists.
34. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. Ore., Jan.
12, 1972) (first certification order), quoted in Memorandum in Support of the Motion of
Eli Lilly & Co. for Certification Procedure a t 2, Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott
Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, filed Mar. 23, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Eli Lilly
Memorandum].
35. These causes of action alleged Robinson-Patman violations on sales to various
governmental agencies. See Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425
U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1976).
36. This is the claim which was ultimately disposed of in Abbott Laboratories v.
Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U S . 1 (1976).
37. Id.
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the district court ordered the filing of a new certificate addressed
to the remaining causes of action.38The plaintiffs subsequently
filed a certificate that was found to be i n a d e q ~ a t eOn
. ~ ~June 30,
1975, the plaintiffs filed their third certificate. By a letter order
dated July 18, 1975, the court held that this certificate was still
inadequate as to the Sherman Act claim.40On December 27,1977,
the court severed the conspiracy cause of action and stayed all
discovery of it. Discovery on the remaining claims was allowed to
proceed by a bench ruling of March 24, l97Sa4l
Viewed from the plaintiffs' perspective, the use of the certification procedure in Portland Retail Druggists has delayed discovery on the Sherman Act claim for over five years. On the other
hand, the certification procedure has apparently helped the Oregon federal court manage discovery in a massive case and identify
issues that could be severed and resolved. At the same time, the
procedure has protected defendants from burdensome discovery
on a claim with regard to which plaintiffs have been unable to
certify a satisfactory factual basis despite having had three distinct chances to do so.
Mountain View, filed March 30, 1977 by thirteen Utah pharmacies, also involves multiple Robinson-Patman Act claims and
an alleged violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In all respects the allegations, which refer to all twenty-eight defendants
en masse, are conclusory and unspecific. The complaint alleges
that the defendants engaged in unlawful price discrimination41by
38. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. Ore., Oct.
10, 1973) (second certification order), cited in Eli Lilly Memorandum, supra note 34, a t
3.
39. Id. (Feb. 19, 1974) (order staying discovery pending submission of an adequate
certificate as ordered on Oct. 10, 1973), cited in Eli Lilly Memorandum, supra note 34, a t
3.
40. This letter order stated, inter a h ,
I have examined, or re-examined, all the certificates filed by plaintiff, including that of June 30, 1975. Some of the materials therein are obviously
irrelevant: this lawsuit does not and will not concern itself with all the practices
of the drug industry, however good or evil they may be. Some of these materials
may be informative, though not of course, necessarily admissible or legally
probative, on the topic of price discrimination. But none even hints that discovery would unearth evidence of Sherman Act violations alleged in the Fifth
Cause.
Id. (letter order of July 18, 1975) (emphasis in original), quoted in Eli Lilly Memorandum,
supra note 34, at 3-4.
41. Memorandum in Support of Response of Portland Defendants to Motion to
Transfer for Consolidated or Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings Pursuant to Section 1407
of Title 28, U.S.C. a t 2, In re Pharmaceutical Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No.
346 (J.P.M.D.L., filed Apr. 24, 1978). The stay continued in effect as of May 4, 1978. Id.
42. See 15 U.S.C. # 13 (1976).
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granting lower prices and more favorable treatment to various
categories of pharmaceutical purchasers other than plaintiffs.
Although the Robinson-Patman Act is directed against discriminatory sales from a particular seller to specific purchasers the
complaint fails to allege any such discriminatory transactions.
The complaint also does not identify the products purportedly
involved. The broad conclusory allegations that all defendants
violated the Sherman Act appear to be the only basis upon which
separate Robinson-Patman Act claims against the separate defendants could be combined in a single
After a flurry of motions,43the court dismissed certain claims
relating to transactions exempt from the Robinson-Patman Act,"
stayed all discovery pending a further order of the court, and
granted plaintiffs three weeks in which to file a motion for leave
to amend the complaint.45The plaintiffs filed such a motion attaching, as ordered, a draft of an amended complaint. Arguing
that the amended complaint contained no more substance than
did the original, counsel for Abbott Laboratories suggested a procedure that would require the plaintiffs to submit a sworn statement or certificate setting forth "all facts known to plaintiffs
which are sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood that discovery in the action will provide evidentiary facts relevant to and
probative of" various allegations in the c ~ m p l a i n t . ~ ~
On January 16, 1978, the court granted the defense motion
for certification and made a bench ruling to that effect which was
clarified in a letter to all counsel two days later. The written
42.1. For a discussion of the problems in bringing such multiple claims, see Note,
Class Actions Under the Robinson-Patman Act: Gold Strike May Be Only Iron Pyrite, 25
Stan. L. Rev. 764 (1973).
43. While some defendants answered the complaint, others filed various motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment. One group of defendants filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, a motion to require plaintiffs to "separately state their
claims," purportedly pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b). Memorandum of
Points and Authority in Support of Defendant Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Separately State. Several
defendants sought an order to delay first wave discovery until the motions were decided.
Others argued that defendants should be allowed to conduct "transaction discovery" to
obtain more specific details about the plaintiffs' allegations after which appropriate motions could be filed. Memorandum of Certain Defendants Concerning Pretrial Scheduling.
44. Sales t o hospitals and other nonprofit organizations "for their own use" are specifically exempted from the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1976). See also Abbott
Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists A s h , 425 U.S. 1 (1976). Sales to any governmental entity have been interpreted as exempt from the Act. 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 539 (1936).
45. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Sept.
6, 1977) (order reflecting rulings of Aug. 15, 1977 scheduling conference).
46. Letter from W. Robert Wright to Judge Aldon J. Anderson (Sept. 12, 1977) (filed
with the clerk of the court Sept. 13, 1977).
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order, entered January 28, required plaintiffs to file "sworn statements setting forth all facts presently known to them, if any,
which support their belief that they possess meritorious claims
under the Sherman and Robinson-Patman A ~ t s . " ~The
' authorization for this procedure emanated, according to the letter to
counsel, from the court's "inherent power and . . . compelling
duty to actively manage cases of the magnitude of the present
action."48 Apparently searching for a specific basis in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for the certificate requirement, the court
seemed to rely on its power to attach conditions to a grant of leave
to amend under Rule 15. Consistent with its opinion "that the
entire focus of the action at this stage should be upon plaintiffs
substantiating the proposed amended complaint," the court ordered all pending defense motions "to be held in abeyance until
the ordered certification procedure has run its course and all
questions and motions relevant thereto are resolved."49The plaintiffs filed a certificate and its sufficiency has been challenged by
the defendants .50

B.

The Basic Structural Features of a Discovery
Certification Procedure

At this point, a brief description of the general contours of
the procedure emerging from the foregoing discussion of Portland
Retail Druggists and Mountain View will be useful. The certification procedure could be invoked a t any time after the filing of the
initial pleadings, either upon motion by a party against whom the
action was directed or sua sponte by the judge to whom the case
was assigned. For the certification procedure to be maximally
effective, it is vital that the judge act on the motion requesting
certification as promptly as possible. Normally he would be able
to assess whether certification was appropriate merely by reading
the complaint and determining whether the risk of discovery
abuse was sufficiently great to warrant certification. In some
cases, the judge may not be in a position to act promptly or may
47. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan.
28, 1978) (certification order). The variations in the language of the certificate requirements are set out in notes 53-55 and accompanying text infra.
48. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan.
18, 1978) (judge's letter to all counsel).
49. Id.
50. The Mountain View plaintiffs have moved for transfer of the Utah action to
Oregon for consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. fi 1407 (1970). In re
Pharmaceutical Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 346 (J.P.M.D.L.,filed Apr. 24,
1978).
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wish to hear both sides before ruling on the certification motion.
In such cases, the judge may wish to stay discovery pending his
ruling on the certification request in order to minimize the risk
of discovery abuse during the (hopefully brief) intervening period.
Assuming the judge decided to require certification, an order
would be issued that would set a reasonable deadline for filing a
certificate and that ideally would specify the type of information
to be included in the certificate. The court could also determine
in its discretion whether counsel should be required to set forth
the facts in a sworn statement, or simply be bound by the standard sanctions of Rule ll?
In general, a certificate should be deemed adequate when, in
view of the circumstances of the case and the nature of the claim,
the plaintiff has adduced sufficient information to establish that
his claim is made in good faith and that there are reasonable
grounds to believe discovery will yield information relevant to an
identifiable claim. This standard may be met affirmatively by
including such information in the certificate, or negatively by
showing that, despite good faith efforts, it has been impossible to
obtain information of the type or degree of particularity specified
in the certification order and that there is some reason to believe
the information is so exclusively within the control of the defendant that only discovery would disclose its existence or nonexistence. Of course, the arguments advanced to meet the standard
negatively would include all those made against certification in
the first place. Normally, then, in order to establish the adequacy
of the certificate in this manner, it would be necessary for a
plaintiff to bring to the court's attention some consideration that
was not raised in the initial arguments against granting a certification request.
In light of the nature of the certification standard just posited, the Portland Retail Druggists order may have demanded too
much by requiring the plaintiff to include information indicating
that there was a "reasonable probability" that "discovery on the
merits [would] produce evidence sufficient to establish each
cause of action."52 A plaintiff could conceivably have sufficient
information to show a reasonable probability that discovery
would be fruitful even though additional evidence from other
sources would then be necessary to establish some or all of the
claims. A certification order which required the plaintiff essen51. See notes 100-01 and accompanying text infra.
52. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. Ore., Jan.
12, 1972) (first certification order), quoted in Eli Lilly Memorandum, supra note 34, at 2.
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tially to prove his case before allowing discovery would clearly
demand too much.
A similar problem arises with respect to the Mountain View
court's order requiring plaintiffs to disclose "all facts presently
known to them . . . which support their belief that they possess
meritorious claims."53While a defendant ought to be able to ascertain whether the plaintiff is capable of making a minimal
threshold showing that he has good grounds for his complaint,
this does not imply that he has a right to learn all that the plaintiff knows before discovery begins.54These examples emphasize
the fact that great care should be given to properly limiting the
scope of the certification request if certification is to become a
legitimate discovery management device.
The approach suggested by the Mountain View court's letter
to counsel is arguably preferable in that it merely asked plaintiffs
to "[set] forth the [as opposed to "all"] facts known to them,
if any, which support their belief that they possess meritorious
claims."55 While not as clear as the standard proposed at the
outset of this Subsection, this certification order has the advantage of clearly focusing the attention of the parties and the court
on whether the plaintiff has a good faith basis for bringing the
action rather than on the quantum of evidence already in the
plaintiffs possession. The principle drawback of the Mountain
View order is that it leaves the plaintiff with considerable uncertainty as to the precise standard the court will use to determine
the sufficiency of the certificate. This difficulty could have been
reduced if the court had detailed more fully the type of information that would be adequate to withstand a sufficiency challenge
and permit discovery to procede normally. For example, the court
might have required the plaintiff to provide particulars regarding
the factual basis for thinking discovery would show that the defendant was somehow connected with harm suffered by the plaintiff.
Since the purpose of certification is merely to protect a defendant from unjustifiable discovery costs, and not to cut off a
plaintiff's claim, a plaintiff who has filed a certificate subsequently deemed inadequate should be given a reasonable num-

--

53. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan.
28, 1978) (certification order).
54. See notes 205-08 and accompanying text infra.
55. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan.
18, 1978) (judge's letter to all counsel). The bench ruling had ordered plaintiffs to "provide
facts through affidavit showing the factual basis upon which the claims made have been
alleged." Transcript of the Proceedings a t 46 (Jan. 16, 1978).
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ber of opportunities for revision. Resulting delays would generally protect rather than prejudice the defendant, and appropriate
adjustments could be made in exceptional cases. If, after repeated attempts, a plaintiff has been unable to meet the minimal
informational demands of a certificate order, the underlying
claim may properly be dismissed. Such a dismissal should be
overturned only if abuse of discretion is found.
The workability of discovery certification, as with other procedural mechanisms, depends to a large extent on the availability
of appropriate sanctions. The possibility that an unwarranted
certification motion might be filed could be deterred by allowing
a court in its discretion to tax the defendant with the plaintiff's
costs occasioned by the motion. The range of sanctions for plaintiff noncompliance with certification requirements is necessarily
more complex and will be dealt with in detail later.56
In addition to sanctions for the abuse of or noncompliance
with discovery certification, certain variations on the procedure
could be developed. In some cases, it may be that the interests
of justice and expeditious management of discovery will be better
served if a party is presented with the alternative of either certifying or being allowed to engage in limited discovery upon the
condition of paying the direct and indirect costs of such discovery
to the defendant (or of posting bond for such costs in the event
Such an alternathat the allegations turn out to be ~nfounded).~'
tive order would have the advantage of allowing discovery to go
forward where the plaintiff was sufficiently convinced of the validity of his claim to bear the initial risk of discovery, while at the
same time insulating the defendant from the costs of potentially
abusive discovery. The fact that a plaintiff would assume this
type of financial burden is obviously a very strong indicator that
the plaintiff's claim is genuine, and it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which a plaintiff willing to bear the risk of loss on
discovery costs should not be allowed to proceed.5ROnce a plain56. See notes 211-34 and accompanying text infra.
57. There would, of course, be difficulties in quantifying the less tangible costs of
gathering such information. But courts continually deal with such valuation problems,
and there is no reason to think that the cost to a defendant of a plaintiff's discovery would
be inherently unquantifiable.
58. Of course, if a plaintiff thought discovery costs were greater than possible discovery benefits, it would be reasonable to utilize the certification device to bar the plaintiff
from proceeding with discovery indefinitely, since it is difficult to see why the defendant
should incur costs that the plaintiff himself would be unwilling to pay. A possible exception to this generalization arises where the cost to the plaintiff of finding certain information is much greater than the cost to the defendant. Certain price information, for example, might be easily accessible to the defendant, but might be difficult and costly for a
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tiff gleans sufficient information to file an adequate certificate
pursuant to an alternative orderAofthis type, discovery would be
allowed to go forward on a normal basis and, if the plaintiff ultimately prevailed on the merits, his expenses in financingjnitial
discovery costs could be recouped to the extent that such costs
are normally taxed to the losing party.
I t should be noted that a discovery certificate is not merely
a kind of particularized pleading. If it were, issuance of a certification order would imply that the pleading against which the
order was directed was legally insufficient. But there is no reason
to think that such would be the case. A judge requiring certification might well consider the initial pleadings sufficient to toll a
statute of limitations or withstand an immediate motion to dismiss. In contrast to an amended pleading, a discovery certificate
does not supplant a prior pleading; it merely adds to the store of
information available for identification and ultimate resolution of
disputed issues without affecting the validity of the original complaint or counterclaim. In this regard, it resembles discovery
more closely than pleading. Certification may best be thought of
as a hybrid procedure intermediate between pleading and fullblown discovery, but conceptually distinct from both.
A certification procedure with the features just described can
serve a number of purposes. First, and perhaps most important,
it is a means whereby certain forms of discovery abuses can be
constrained if not eliminated. The tactic of filing an action and
then settling for an amount below the defense startup costs would
be emasculated in cases where there is no reasonable basis for the
claim. The procedure may also be of assistance to the trial judge
in supervising the course of discovery. As in the Portland Retail
Druggists case, it may well be that certification will result in a
plaintiff to find if it were simply allowed to fish through a sea of documents. A parallel
problem arises in the context of administering Federal Rule 33(c), which allows a party
to answer interrogatories simply by specifying the records from which the answer may be
derived and allowing the party serving the interrogatories to inspect them. This procedure
is theoretically available only when "the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is
substantially the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served." FED.
R. CIV.P. 33(c). The difficulty, of course, is assessing when the burdens are sufficiently
similar on the opposing parties to allow this shifting of discovery costs. See 8 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER,FEDERAL
PRACITCE
AND PROCEDURE
5 2178, a t 570-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT
& MILLER].Presumably, a court exercising its discretion in the certification
context could evaluate relative production burdens and tailor an alternative certification
order accordingly. One must also remember that, generally, a plaintiff who knows enough
to specify why eliciting particular information will be much more costly for himself than
for the opposing party probably has sufficient information t o comply with a certification
order.
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determination by a judge that discovery should go forward on
certain aspects of a plaintiff's claim, but be postponed as to other
more nebulous claims. This gives the plaintiff additional time to
formulate the factual basis for a claim in more questionable areas
while allowing discovery to proceed where there is good ground to
think it will be fruitful.
Perhaps the most significant practical problem with the certification procedure derives from the fact that it is as yet essentially an untested device. There is no way a t this point to determine with any precision how effective it is at actually eliminating
the costs which create the leverage for extortionlike ~ e t t l e r n e n t s . ~ ~
In fairness, it must be recognized that many of the costs associated with early discovery will continue to accrue whether or not
certification is invoked. While some of the larger expenses, such
as deposition costs, preparation of answers to the plaintiff's interrogatories, and costs deriving from discovery disputes would obviously be eliminated pending submission of an adequate certificate, others, such as those for filing responsive pleadings and
analyzing possible bases for dismissal or summary judgment,
would probably continue." Particularly in cases as large as those
in which certification would likely be invoked, parties and counsel are unlikely to hold off planning defense strategy pending
compliance with a certification order.
The continuation of these expenses, however, does not necessarily impugn the certification procedure's workability. T h e
ongoing costs may reflect concerns either that the plaintiff does
have a viable claim or that the judicial system may fail to detect
a groundless one. These costs therefore are attributable not to a
defect in the certification procedure but to the defendant's own
uncertainty as to the strength of its position or to risks inherent
in the judicial process. The certification procedure would operate
to hold such "insurance" expenses at an unburdensome level, and
particularly where a defendant is confident that a complaint is
59. In the Mountain View case, for example, a number of stipulated dismissals have
been entered since the entry of the certification order in January. See, e.g., Mountain View
Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Mar. 9, 1978) (order dismissing defendant Squibb); id. (May 18, 1978) (order dismissing defendant Hoechst-Roussel
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.). Of course, it is difficult to know whether such dismissals reflect
nuisance value settlements or legitimate settlements based upon realistic assessment of
the merits. T o the extent they reflect the latter, their existence is no indictment of the
practicality of certification, since it was never intended to impede settlement on the
merits. Indeed, its purpose is to promote that end by insuring that settlements do not
occur simply because of the burdens associated with the defense of unfounded claims.
60. See table a t p. 304, supra.
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groundless, will act as a good insulator against unjustifiable expense.
Moreover, even if certification does not entirely eliminate
costs extrinsic to the risk of loss on the merits, it certainly alters
the atmosphere in which settlement negotiations would occur.
The defendant's cost of continued involvement in the action is
reduced a t least temporarily because the risk of incurring substantial discovery costs is largely eliminated. In addition, if a
court imposes sanctions for a plaintiff's failure to comply with a
certification order, the defendant may ultimately be able to recoup all its costs incurred in defending the action?' Thus, while
there may be some defendants who feel the only way to "stop the
meter" and avoid the costs flowing from involvement in an antitrust action is to enter into a nuisance value settlement, the certification device still has considerable utility. Finally, recognition
of a certification procedure would give the judge an identifiable
tool to restrain early discovery abuse and would eliminate the
problem of his constantly having second thoughts about which of
the numerous potential bases for the exercise of his discretion is
specifically being called into play.

The fact that the certification device may constitute a useful
technique for constraining certain forms of discovery abuse does
not, of course, insure that the procedure is authorized. In fact, one
of the major problems with which the Portland Retail Druggists
and Mountain View courts wrestled was precisely whether they
had the power to stay discovery pending submission of an adequate certificate. This Section will analyze the various possible
bases for such power within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
and within the inherent power of a court insofar as it bears on this
issue." To the extent that this analysis identifies limits on, as well
as grounds for, judicial power to require certification, it necessarily prefigures the discussion of limitations on the scope of the
procedure in Section IV.63
61. See notes 223-34 and accompanying text infra.
62. See notes 180-202 and accompanying text infra.
63. See notes 203-10 and accompanying text infra.
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A.
I.

Specific Bases in the Federal Rules

Rule 15

The judge in the Mountain View case apparently felt most
comfortable in basing his decision to require certification on his
discretionary power to attach conditions to the grant of leave to
file an amended ~omplaint.'~
Rule 15 provides that, except for one
amendment which is allowed as a matter of course prior to the
filing of a responsive pleading, "a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party
. . . ."65 Similarly, the "court may, upon reasonable notice and
upon such terms as are just, permit [a party] to serve a supplemental pleading . . . ."" Since it is well settled that in appropriate circumstances a court may deny leave to amend ~ u t r i g h t , ' ~
may impose suitable conditions upon the grant of leave to
amend,68or may even require a party to amend a pleading that
fails to adequately state a claim in order to avoid dismissal,fig
there would appear to be no obstacle to requiring certification as
a condition for amending or supplementing pleadings, so long as
this results in no infraction of the liberal amendment policies of
Rule 15. As a practical matter, since the great majority of complicated cases are based upon amended or supplemental pleadings
by the time they reach trial, Rule 15 would be available as a basis
for certification in a wide range of cases.
Of course, one of the key premises of Rule 15 is that "leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires."70 While the deter64. See Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah,
Jan. 18, 1978) (judge's letter to all counsel).
65. FED.R. CIV.P. 15(a) (emphasis added).
66. FED.R. CIV.P. 15(d).
67. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31
(1971) (denial justified in light of substantial prejudice to opposing party); Heart Disease
Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972) (first
amended complaint had already failed to allege sufficient facts to support a "bare bones"
antitrust conspiracy claim); Miller v. Steinbach, 43 F.R.D. 275, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(denial where allegations were identical to counts of original complaint which had already
been dismissed and stricken).
68. See, e.g., Firchau v. Diamond Nat'l Corp., 345 F.2d 269, 275 (9th Cir. 1965);
Hayes v. Parkview-Gem of Hawaii, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 436, 442 (D. Hawaii 1976); Prandini
v. National Tea Co., 62 F.R.D. 503, 506 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Sherrell v. Mitchell Aero, Inc.,
340 F. Supp. 219, 222 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Thermal Dynamics Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
42 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D.N.H. 1967); Chamberlin v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 194
PRACTICE
7 15.08, at 935 (2d ed.
F. Supp. '647, 651 (E.D. Pa. 1961); 3 MOORE'SFEDERAL
1974) [hereinafter cited as MOORE];6 WRIGHT& MILLER,supra note 58, § 1486, a t 42324 (1971).
& MILLER,
supra note 58, 5 1473, a t 376 (1971); see Benner v. Philadel69. 6 WRIGHT
phia Musical Soc'y Local 77, 32 F.R.D. 197, 199 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
70. FED.R. CIV.P. 15(a).
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mination of whether leave to amend should be granted rests with
the discretion of the trial court," the liberal amendment policy
articulated by the wule demands that there be some justification
for denial of leave. Generally, this takes the form of a showing
that the opposing party would be prejudiced in some manner if
leave were granted.72 As the Supreme Court has suggested in
discussing the liberality with which amendments should be permitted:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an
opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any
apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive o n t h e part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies b y a m e n d m e n t s previously allowed, undue
prejudice t o the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
a m e n d m e n t , futility o f a m e n d m e n t , etc.-the leave sought
should, as the rules require, be "freely given."73

The Court's catalog of the situations in which leave might be
denied has close affinities with the factors that would justify a
. ~ ~ central purpose of the certijudge in requiring ~ e r t i f i c a t i o nThe
fication procedure is to help eliminate abuses in the early phases
of discovery which may reflect bad faith, bludgeon tactics, or
failure to possess or adequately articulate a claim, and which
could prejudice an opposing party by causing inconvenience and
possibly, in the event of a nuisance value settlement, preclude a
determination on the merits. Conditioning leave to amend on the
submission of an adequate certificate would thus appear to be
well within the limits of a court's discretion under Rule 15, particularly since a certification order is considerably less drastic than
denying leave to amend.
A few cases have suggested that "a district court will not use
its power under Rule 15(a) to require amendments for the sole
purpose of obtaining evidentiary details that would be available
through the discovery process."75 Superficially, such holdings
appear to run counter to the philosophy behind the certification
procedure. The cases involved, however, are clearly distinguishable from the situations in which the certification procedure
71. The trial court's exercise of discretion is not subject to appellate review except
for abuses of discretion. Ziegler v. Akin, 261 F.2d 88, 90 (10th Cir. 1958).
72. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330-31 (1971).
73. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (emphasis added).
74. See notes 208-09 and accompanying text infra.
75. 6 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note 58, 4 1473, at 377 (1971) (footnote omitted).
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would be appropriate. One such case, Mahon v. Bennett,76was a
simple two-party breach of contract action where the defendant
sought specific details about the contract. Where a case is thus
lacking in complexity and the issues are sufficiently well defined
that discovery may proceed in an orderly manner, the parties may
properly be directed to seek such information through discovery.
The use of either Rule 15(a) or discovery certification in such a
setting would be equally inappropriate. In another case, Galdi v.
Jones," the Second Circuit overturned a default judgment entered upon failure of the plaintiff to comply with an order requiring very detailed particularization of the facts undergirding his
claim. The court's decision was predicated on the availability of
discovery. The facts in this case were more analogous in complexity to those in a case appropriate for certification, but the nature
of the particularization required differed appreciably from that
which would be proper in a discovery certificate. The certifying
party is not required to show the facts which substantiate a claim,
but rather the facts that provide some basis for believing discovery might yield evidentiary facts. As in Mahon, the fact that the
parties in Galdi were correctly relegated to discovery procedures
rather than granted a remedy rooted in Rule 15(a) does not imply
that a Rule 15(a) based certification procedure is never appropriate.
2.

Rule 16

Under Rule 16 the court in its discretion may direct counsel
to appear a t a pretrial conference to consider, in addition to specifically enumerated issues, "[sluch other matters as may aid in
the disposition of the action."78 This provision has been interpreted as a source of broad discretion for the trial court;7gtherefore, the court is free to choose from a wide variety of mechanisms
to clarify the issues and avoid unnecessary costs. In those instances where the discovery process threatens to become a source of
overwhelming expense to parties brought into the action on the
basis of sweeping, unspecific allegations, certification would appear to be a legitimate and useful device that could be wielded
by a court in connection with a pretrial conference under the
auspices of Rule 16.
76.
77.
78.
79.

6 F.R.D. 213 (W.D.
Mo. 1946).
141 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1944).
FED.R. CIV. P. 16.
3 MOORE,
supra note 68, T[ 16.16 (2d ed. 1974).

'
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The purposes of the pretrial conference have been explained
by Professor Moore:
One of the prime purposes of the Federal Rules is to expedite the disposition of cases and lessen the cost of litigation.
This is indicated in Rule 1. . . . The pre-trial conference under
Rule 16 plays an important part in achieving this purpose. The
rule establishes legal machinery whereby the court, as well as
the parties, may participate in . . . the sifting of issues and
evidence in actions pending before it, with the view of simplifying, shortening and possibly avoiding a trial. The chief purposes
. . . are to define and simplify the issues . . . .80

Rule 16 has been seen as promoting goals very similar to those of
the discovery rules,s1but the objectives are not identical nor are
In fact, Professors Wright and
the procedures inter~hangeable.~~
Miller note that "as a result of the simplified pleading allowed
under Rule 8 and the broad, frequently unstructured, discovery
permitted by Rules 26 through 37, greater reliance must be placed
on the pretrial hearing as the vehicle for informing the parties of
precisely what is in controversy. "s3
Many courts have held that the pretrial conference should be
conducted a t the conclusion of discoverys4and commentators
have agreed that this is the normal practice.85 In complex and
protracted cases, however, pretrial conferences have been recognized as valuable tools in guiding and structuring the discovery
process itself? Indeed, the Manual for Complex L i t i g a t i ~ n , ~ ~
80. Id. 7 16.02, a t 1105-06 (footnotes omitted).
81. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
82. 6 WRIGHT& MILLER,supra note 58, 4 1528, a t 615 (1971).
83. Id. 5 1522, a t 567-68 (footnote omitted).
84. See, e.g., Commercial Ins. Co. v. Smith, 417 F.2d 1330, 1334 (10th Cir. 1969).
85. 3 MOORE,supra note 68, 77 16.08, 16.16, at 1126 (2d ed. 1974) ("normally"); 6
WRIGHT& MILLER,supra note 58, § 1524, a t 580 (1971). Wright and Miller note that three
jurisdictions (Alaska, Connecticut, and Nebraska) have local rules requiring completion
of discovery before pretrial. Id. a t 580 n.50.
86. 3 MOORE,supra note 68, 16.08 (2d ed. 1974). See also Leumi Financial Corp. v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 295 F. Supp. 539, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Wright and Miller note that "preliminary utilization of pretrial conferences would
enable the court to define the issues and eliminate unnecessary discovery . . . ." 6
WRIGHT& MILLER,supra note 58, § 1530, a t 625 (1971) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In complicated cases, to be effective for these ends the pretrial narrowing of issues
must precede discovery. See Life Music, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 31 F.R.D. 3, 5
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). Where the pleadings make only generalized, conclusory allegations, the
impetus for very early conferences is even greater. Certification at the pretrial conference
stage would help to determine whether discovery is appropriate a t all by evaluating
whether the plaintiff has a good faith basis for bringing the claim.
FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION
(rev. ed. 1977). The title was changed from
87. MANUAL
Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation to clarify that the Manual is recom-
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which would typically be applicable in cases amenable to certification, specifically provides for the use of four pretrial conferencesggas a means of controlling complex actions. The Manual
sugge$s that the first such conference, known as the preliminary
or scheduling conference, take place before any discovery proceedings commence to permit the court to discuss with counsel
the basic issues and attempt to determine what pretrial procedures may be necessary.89As a rule, the preliminary conference
will include discussion of the possibility of an early settlementm
and notification to the parties that preclusion orders will issue for
noncompliance with pretrial orders.91
With its recognition that flexibility is a key to discovery management, and that pretrial conferences may be modified as the
judge sees fit in light of the circumstances of a particular case,g2
the Manual provides additional support for the propriety of discovery certification. The decision to issue a certification order can
be viewed simply as a manifestation of the kind of flexible guidance recommended by the Manual. Moreover, certification can
be used to complement the procedures the Manual outlines. But,
mended in all civil and criminal actions and not exclusively for multidistrict litigation.
Id. at xx.
The Manual defines complex litigation as "one case or two or more related cases
which present unusual problems and which require extraordinary treatment, including
but not limited to the cases designated as 'protracted' and 'big.' " Id. § 0.10, at 4. Complex
or multidistrict litigation is defined by Wright and Miller as litigation "involving 'either
large numbers of plaintiffs, suing in many district courts on essentially the same facts, or
many complex and interrelated issues which require the evaluation of large quantitites of
& MILLER,
supra note 58, 4 1530, a t 626-27 (1971) (citing Comment,
data.'." 6 WRIGHT
Observations on the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 68 MICH.L. REV.
303, 303 (1969)).
88. Each conference is structured in greater detail than is outlined in Rule 16. See
MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION
4 4 0.40, 1.00, 2.00, 3.00 & 4.00 (rev. ed. 1977).
89. See id. 5 1.10. At the first conference, timetables are set for the first wave of
discovery, which is designed to disclose the names and location of witnesses whose written
interrogatories or depositions may be sought and the existence, location, and custodian
of documents and other physical evidence. Id. 0 4 0.10, 1.50. Consolidation and joinder
matters are also discussed. Id. § 1.60.
90. Id. 0 1.21.
91. Id. § 1.11.
92. The Manual recognizes that ''[all1 of the suggested procedures are not suitable
for every complex case; nor are they necessarily the best that can be devised. Judges and
lawyers, therefore, are encouraged to improve them and to adapt them to the particular
case being processed . . . ." Id. a t 4. "It is not intended, however, to recommend an
inflexible program of holding only four principal pretrial conferences. The suggestions
made herein are subject always to the discretion of each judge to deviate and innovate
where necessary or desirable." Id. 4 0.40, a t 12 (emphasis added).
"[F]lexibility in applying the directives for pretrials is the key to effective and
sensible Court administration of [Rule 161." Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 451,
465 (1970).
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since the first conference does not usually take place until a t least
a month or two after the action is filed, it may not come soon
enough to deal with the types of problems certification is designed
to handle. The filing of a certification motion, however, may alert
the judge to the need for an expedited pretrial schedule and may
help structure the first conference.
While the Manual generally tends to buttress the notion of
certifi~ation,'~
there is one particular in which it appears to detract from it. The current Manual's introduction notes that some
procedures suggested in its precursor, the Handbook of Recornmended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases,g4are no
longer encouraged. One of these is specified as the "unsound
practice of staying of discovery until the issues are formed."95
Although this language could be construed as an indictment of
the certification procedure, its actual concern is quite different.
The Manual's objection is directed against a wooden insistence
that issues be framed before discovery can proceed. Certification
is less demanding and more flexible. While it does prompt some
measure of issue crystalization, its primary concern is with the
imposition of unjustifiable discovery costs on an innocent party
rather than with neat organization of the issues. The standards
of compliance are minimal and the procedure can be tailored to
stay discovery on all or merely some aspects of a case until sufficient foundational data is supplied by the plaintiff. In contrast
to the problem identified by the Manual, it does not insist on full
elaboration of issues as a prerequisite to discovery.
Use of the certification procedure to permit better court
management of the discovery process through pretrial conferences may find even stronger support in the Federal Rules if the
proposed amendment to add subsection (f) to Rule 26 is adopted.
That amendment would allow any party to request a "discovery
conference" as a matter of right a t "any time after commencement of an action," provided "that counsel . . . has made a reasonable effort with opposing counsel to reach agreement on the
matters set f ~ r t hin the request."" The committee proposing the
amendment contemplates that the discovery conference would be
confined to "the exceptional case" where "early intervention by
93. The Manual specifically notes that by following its suggestions a judge may
FOR COM"prevent abuse of discovery in complex cases by any and all parties." MANAUL
PLEX LITIGATION
8 0.60 (rev. ed. 1977).
94. 25 F.R.D.351 (1960).
FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION
3 n.3 (rev. ed. 1977).
95. MANUAL
96. 1978 PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS,
supra note 6, at 7-8, 11.
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the court appears preferable to a series of motions to compel or
to limit d i s c o ~ e r y . "A
~ ~district judge in a complex case might
usefully require a plaintiff who has filed a nebulous complaint t o
submit a discovery certificate a t an initial discovery conference
to ascertain whether there is good ground for imposing the burdens of discovery.* In some cases, of course, it may be more
fruitful simply to hold the conference without insisting on the
formality of discovery certification. In larger cases, however, certification may prove to be a useful device to help answer threshold questions about the need for discovery in general and as to
particular claims.
Some might object to the use of the pretrial conference under
the present rules as a device for early control of discovery on the
ground that the pretrial conference is intended to narrow the
issues by encouraging agreement among the parties themselves.
As expressed by the Reporter to the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, "the proper function of
pre-trial is not to club [one party] . . . into submission," but
rather the emphasis is upon agreement of the parties? The certification procedure, however, is not a means of coercion but rather
a means of ascertaining that there exists a basis for subjecting a
defendant to discovery and its attendant costs. This lack of coercive effect is emphasized by the very minimal factual showing
required of the plaintiff. Any plaintiff who has a valid basis for
believing discovery will produce necessary information would be
permitted to proceed.
Although no one has yet sought discovery certification on the
basis of Rule 16, there appears to be no reason why the power to
convene pretrial conferences could not be interpreted as implicitly authorizing the use of certification during the initial stages
of a case for the purpose of pretrial scrutiny of loosely drawn,
sprawling complaints which name any number of peripheral defendants and involve complex issues of a magnitude that would
inflict substantial discovery costs on the parties and the courts.
97. Id. at 11.
98. Cf. Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1047 (9th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972) (action dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b)
because of repeated failure of plaintiff to provide court with statement of particulars from
which basis for Sherman Act claim could be inferred).
99. Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Trial, 29 F.R.D. 454,456 (1961). See also
J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir.
1976) (nothing in Rule 16 gives trial court power to force stipulation of facts). Cf. Life
Music, Inc. v. Edelstein, 309 F.2d 242,243 (2d Cir. 1962) (the court may tentatively define
issues basically agreed upon by attorneys despite lack of formal assent); Renfrew, supra
note 20. at 60 (if attorneys do not find ways to limit discovery burdens, the judiciary will).
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Such a procedure would seem to be consonant with the policy of
the rule and in line with the breadth of discretion which the rule
confers on trial judges.
3. Rule 11

The propriety of a discovery certification procedure is also
supported in some measure by Rule 11, which deals with the
signing of pleadings. The rule states that "[tlhe signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay."lw The rule further provides that a pleading
signed with the intent to defeat the purpose of the rule may be
stricken as sham and false, and in the event that the violation was
willful, the attorney filing the pleading may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. lol
Because the rule does away with the requirement of verified
pleadings "[elxcept when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute,"lo2 the argument might be raised that Rule 11 cuts
against the legitimacy of a certification procedure, a t least to the
extent that certification is equivalent to verification that the
complaint was filed in good faith. However, the elimination of the
verification requirement was merely designed to do away with
"the all too barren formality of an oath to pleadings;"lo3 it was
certainly not intended to relieve counsel of their obligation of
good faith and avoidance of delay.lo4
Rule 11sanctions have been invoked to deal with abuses very
much like those the certification procedure is designed to handle.
In Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan
Association, lo5 a group of mortgage borrowers filed actions against
100. FED.R. CN. P. 11.
101. Id.
102. Id. Verification is specifically required by Rule 23.1 (derivative actions brought
by a shareholder); Rule 27(a) (petition for the perpetuation of testimony before commencement of an action); Rule 65(b) (ex parte request for a temporary restraining order);
and Rule 66 (proceedings for the appointment of the receiver impliedly require verification
since verification was a standard feature of prior practice referred to by the rule). Among
the major federal statutes requiring verification are the following: 8 U.S.C. § 1445(a)
(1976) (petition for naturalization); 11 U.S.C. 8 41(c) (1976) (petitions for voluntary and
involuntary bankruptcies); 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1970) (removal of actions from state court);
28 U.S.C. 8 1734(b) (1970) (replacement of lost or destroyed court records); 28 U.S.C. §
1915 (1970) (proceedings in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. 5 1924 (1970) (verification of bill
of costs); and 28 U.S.C. 8 2242 (1970) (application for writ of habeas corpus).
103. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 463 (1942).
104. See id.
105. 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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some 177 mortgage-lending institutions. They alleged, inter alia,
that the defendant institutions had conspired to eliminate interest on escrow accounts employed to collect tax and utility fees,
and thereby reduce competition in the market for borrowers. The
plaintiffs' attorneys had simply gone through the Philadelphia
phone book and sued every individual or lending institution listed
that might possibly use such accounts.108More than one-fourth of
these defendants were subsequently dismissed from the case because they did not even practice the escrow method of collecting
such fees. Through their dragnet approach the plaintiffs' attorneys imposed indiscriminate inconvenience, expense, and possible anxiety upon a large number of innocent parties, in effect
imposing upon them the costs of winnowing out the groundless
claims.
The Kinee court noted that when the plaintiffs' attorneys
signed their pleading, they had no reasonable basis to believe that
the allegations therein were true as to each defendant. At best,
they were aware that within the aggregate mass of defendants
sued some defendants were possibly guilty of the alleged violations. The court held that this was an abuse of process and a
violation of Rule 11.Io7 Since the pleadings asserted potentially
good claims against the defendants remaining in the action, the
court held that it would be inappropriate to apply the sanction
of striking the pleading as a sham. Instead, the court notified the
attorneys for the dismissed defendants that they could file a bill
of costs for their clients' expenses to be taxed to the plaintiffs'
attorneys. Io8
While differing in some respects from discovery certification,
the procedure applied in Kinee is certainly suggestive of the legitimacy of the certification technique. Kinee recognized the problem of potential pretrial abuses whereby plaintiffs unfairly impose the costs of gathering information on innocent defendants
without exerting any effort to determine whether there is good
ground for the claim asserted. In dealing with this abuse, the
court imposed a sanction that was not specifically provided for
under the rules, but one that was well tailored to rectify the
unfairness of imposing fact-gathering costs on innocent parties.
The authority of a court to strike a pleading signed in violation of Rule 11 or to impose alternative sanctions is well estab106. Id. at 982.
107. Id. at 982-83.
108. Id. at 983.
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lished,logalthough these measures are seldom invoked.l1° Pleadings have been stricken in an action where it was clear that the
named plaintiff was essentially recruited by the attorney and
knew little or nothing of the nature of the claim.lll This suggests
the significance of a plaintiff's informational basis for his allegations, albeit from a slightly different angle. Another court, after
noting a litigant's obligation under Rule 11 to certify that there
is good ground for a claim, has stressed the significance of particularization of issues to the management of protracted litigation.l12 Thus, to the extent certification is a means whereby a
court can determine during early stages of litigation whether a
pleading is merely a sham properly dismissible under Rule 11,
certification in appropriate cases would appear to be a reasonable
exercise of a court's authority to monitor the good faith of the
parties and decide whether there are good grounds113for particular allegations in a complaint.
4. Rule 26

In many ways, the certification procedure is closely analogous to Rule 26(c) which provides that "for good cause shown, the
court . . . may make any order which justice requires to protect
a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or
undue burden or expense" in the discovery process.l14 A similar
provision was originally part of Rule 3O(b), but was' made applicable to all discovery as part of the 1970 amendments. In addition
to creating Rule 26(c), the changes included a clarification explicitly granting the court power to protect parties and witnesses
against "undue burden or expense."l15 The rule enumerates eight
types of orders that the court might choose in appropriate circumstances, including an order "that the discovery may be had only
on specified terms and conditions."116Moreover, this list is not
exhaustive. I t certainly does not preclude the court from using
109. See, e.g., Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Risinger, Honesty
in Pleading and I'ts Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil
L. REV.1, 34-37 (1976).
Procedure 11, 61 MINN.
110. Risinger, supra note 109, at 34-37.
111. Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 397-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
112. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242, 271 (8th Cir. 1969)
(dictum).
113. For an excellent discussion of what constitutes "good grounds" under Rule 11,
see Risinger, supra note 109, at 52-61.
114. FED.R. CIV. P. 26(c).
115. Advisory Comm. Note, 48 F.R.D. 505 (1970).
116. FED.R. CIV.P. 26(c)(2).
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mechanisms such as certification to the extent that they promote
the policy behind the rule. Rule 26(c) thus reinforces the notion
that the trial court has complete control over the discovery process and has very broad discretion to impose such restrictions or
conditions as it deems necessary for the management of a particular case.l17
The courts, in exercising this discretion, have been particularly conscious of the need to impose limitations on discovery in
complex litigation, "where the possibility of abuse is always present."llR The discovery rules require that a judge strike a balance
between permitting a full inquiry through liberal discovery and
protecting against its possible "harmful side effects."l19 In determining what is unduly burdensome the court must take into account the individual circumstances of the action before it.
"[Elven very slight inconvenience may be unreasonable if there
is no occasion for the inquiry and it cannot benefit the party
making it?" Certification could serve a particularly valuable
role in identifying those situations in which a claim is so lacking
in foundation that it would be unreasonable to allow discovery to
go forward at all.
Certification can thus be viewed as an extension of the remedies available to a court under Rule 26(c). But, while certification
is designed to fulfill the same basic purposes as Rule 26(c) remedies, it is intended to be exercised primarily in cases sufficiently
complex to create a significant risk of discovery abuse and a t a
stage in the proceedings earlier than that at which Rule 26(c)
normally comes into play. Certification differs from Rule 26(c)
remedies in other significant respects. In contrast to certification,
Rule 26(c) is structured to allow challenges only after unduly
burdensome discovery has been sought by an opposing party. The
courts have reinforced this anangement,121noting that the parties
117. 8 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note 58, 8 2036, at 267-68 (1970). See also Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Center Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358, 362 (10th Cir. 1964).
118. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661, 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also United
States v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 268 F. Supp. 769,774 (D.N.J. 1966). But see Waldron v. Cities Serv. Co., 361 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank
v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968) (discovery proceeded over a period of nine years
before the court decided that plaintiff had had "more than ample opportunities" to find
evidence of his claim filed on a "hunch or suspicion").
119. 4 MOORE,supra note 68, 1[ 26.67, at 26-487 (2d ed. 1976).
& MILLER,supra note 58, 8 2036, at 270 (1970) (footnote omitted). See
120. 8 WRIGHT
also Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 4 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 487, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 219 n.9 (D. Del. 1960) ("discovery
has limits and . . . these limits grow more formidable as the showing of need decreases").
121. Neonex Int'l Ltd. v. Norris Grain Co., 338 F. Supp. 845, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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should proceed on their own and seek court intervention "only
where bad faith, annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or the
like are the purpose of the examination, or other special circumstances
This structural difference between certification
and Rule 26(c) has particular significance with regard to the
problem of equalizing the startup burdens of plaintiffs and defendants in complex antitrust litigation. Whereas the burden of
showing that a discovery request is unreasonable under Rule 26
lies with the party against whom discovery is sought,ln the burden of establishing the requisite threshold information for certification lies with the party seeking discovery. Finally, Rule 26(c)
has simply not been applied in a manner that would allow its
remedies to serve as functional equivalents for certification.12'
Even Rule 26(c)(2), which parallels the certification notion most
closely in that it allows a court to limit the "terms and conditions" upon which discovery may be granted, has generally been
applied merely to impose conditions related to the convenience
of the parties in terms of time and place,lu and has not been used
to establish threshold informational requirements as a prerequisite for further discovery.
In summary, Rule 26(c) provides authority by analogy for
certification, but the two remedies are distinct enough that Rule
26(c) could probably not be made to serve as an adequate substitute for certification in those unusually complex and nebulous
cases where certification would be most salutary. Of course, once
an adequate certificate is filed with the court in response to a
certification order, discovery would proceed along its normal
course and the panoply of sanctions and remedies established by
the Federal Rules would come into play.

B. Rule 83 and the Decisionmaking Power of the Court
One of the clearest sources of authority for a discovery certification rule is found in Rule 83, which provides:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges
thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing
122. Laverett v. Continental Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80,82 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).
123. FED.R. CIV.P. 26(c).
124. As a practical matter, Rule 26(c) is infrequently used. See 1978 PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS,supra note 6, at 35.
supra note 68, 126.70 (2d ed. 1976); 8 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra
125. See 4 MOORE,
note 58, $ 2038 (1970). The concern with time and place convenience extends to those
supra note
conditions which impose expense reimbursement requirements. See 4 MOORE,
68, fl 26.77 (2d ed. 1976).
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its practice not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of rules and
amendments so made by any district court shall upon their
promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts
may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
these r ~ 1 e s . l ~ ~

The rule establishes two independent powers that courts may
invoke to fill procedural gaps within the federal system. These
two powers have been appropriately characterized as a rulemaking power and a decisionmaking power.ln
The drafters of the Federal Rules were very conscious of the
fact that they were creating two distinct powers under Rule 83.
They anticipated that the rulemaking power would be used rather
infrequently, and that it would be applied primarily to fill deliberate gaps left in the civil rules to accommodate recognized local
needs.128It was not expected that rulemaking would be applied
l ~ contrast
~
to the limto sensitive issues of nationwide i r n ~ 0 r t .In
ited role envisioned for the rulemaking power, the drafters expected much greater reliance to be placed on the decisionmaking
power.lsOUnlike the language creating the rulemaking power,
which was derived from various pre-1938 statutes,lslthe language
establishing the decisionmaking power was new with the federal
rules.ls2Significantly, the drafters regarded it as one of the most
l ~ ~ were apparently
important additions in the new r ~ 1 e s . They
126. FED.R. CIV.P. 83.
L. REV.1251, 1252 (1967)
127. Note, Bule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM.
[hereinafter cited as Local Federal Rules].
128. 12 WRIGHT
& MILLER,supra note 58, § 3152, a t 218 (1973); Local Federal Rules,
supra note 127, at 1253.
& MILLER,
supra note 58, 4 3152, a t 220 (1973).
129. 12 WRIGHT
130. Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t 1253.
131. The language of the first sentence of Rule 83 traces its ancestry ultimately to
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 8 17, 1 Stat. 83. See Local Federal Rules, supra note
127, at 1253 & n.9. It was closely modeled upon two earlier grants of rulemaking power-a
predecessor of the current 28 U.S.C. 8 2071 (1970) and Equity Rule 79,226 U.S. 673 (1912).
See Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t 1253-54 & nn.10-11.
132. Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t 1254.
133. Commenting on this new power, a member of the Advisory Committee stated
that this provision is
"one of the most important and salutary in the entire set of rules. It closes all
gaps in the rules. It puts an end to the whole of the Conformity Act, and it
permits judges to decide the unusual or minor procedural problems that arise
in any system of jurisprudence in the light of the circumstances that surround
them and of the justice of the case without the complications and injustice that
must attend attempts to forecast the situations and to regulate them in advance
either by general or by local rule."
& MILLER,supra note 58, 1 3155, a t 242-43 (1973) (quoting Proceedings, Wash12 WRIGHT
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impressed by the potential for procedural flexibility afforded by
this rule's allowance of case-by-case handling of unique or unforeseen problems. Within the overall system of uniformity contemplated by the new Federal Rules, Rule 83 was to serve the vital
function of allocating to the good sense and sound discretion of
district judges the responsibility of dealing with those situations
which prospective rules could not adequately handle. Therefore,
the decisionmaking power was theoretically supposed to play a
much more significant role than the making of local rules. In
practice, the tendency has been somewhat the opposite.134District courts have adopted a plethora of local rules,135whereas the
decisionmaking power remains little known and little used.136
The discovery certification procedure can very easily be conceived of as a procedural mechanism properly deriving from a
court's decisionmaking power under Rule 83. It is not a procedure
which should be invoked as a matter of course, even in identifiable situations such as the large antitrust case. Rather, it is a
device which is available when circumstances warrant reducing
or eliminating the risk of discovery abuse. Thus, it is necessarily
a creature of judicial discretion and one which must be invoked
on a case-by-case basis.13' The question therefore becomes
whether the limitations circumscribing the scope of Rule 83 prevent the rule from serving as the basis for the discovery certification device.
Before proceeding to a discussion of this question, a methodological point must be made. Because most of the case law and
scholarly analysis which has examined the scope of Rule 83 focuses on the rulemaking power, analysis of the boundaries of the
decisionmaking power must necessarily rely upon analogies
ington Institute on the Federal Rules 129 (1938) (statement of Edgar Tolman)). He further
noted that overuse of the rulemaking power would tend to impair the usefulness of the
final sentence of Rule 83. Id. This statement does not indicate how "unusual or minor"
procedural problems must be before they qualify as fit subjects for the exercise of decisionmaking power, and therefore the statement does not shed much light on the scope of Rule
83. However, it does underscore the significance that the drafters attached to this provision.
& MILLER,
supra note 58, 8 3155, a t 243 (1973).
134. 12 WRIGHT
135. Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A
Survey, 1966 DUKEL.J. 1011, 1012 [hereinafter cited as Local Rules Survey].
136. Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t 1265.
137. Because of the inherently discretionary nature of the certification device, it may
be preferable to avoid formalizing it through rulemaking a t the local or national level.
Such rulemaking would more adequately apprise parties of the availability of the procedure, but (particularly if it went beyond merely specifying the nature of the procedure
and the factors which should guide judicial discretion in deciding to invoke it) would
inevitably destroy some of the flexibility which is one of the key assets of certification.
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drawn from restrictions on local rulemaking. While some of the
limitations developed for rulemaking may be inapplicable in the
decisionmaking context, they provide the only available clues to
the contours of Rule 83.
The chief limitation on the scope of Rule 83 power is that it
may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the Federal
speaking, judicial action under Rule 83 can be
R ~ 1 e s . Broadly
l~~
"inconsistent" either in the strong sense of running flatly counter
to the provisions of the rules, or in the weak sense of constituting
an independent procedural norm or device in a field totally occupied by the Federal Rules. Since it is easiest to make the argument that certification is inconsistent with the rules in the weak
sense (certification is obviously a novel device which operates on
terrain arguably covered by the rules), we will first consider
whether inconsistency in this sense is sufficient to make Rule 83
unavailable as a basis for certification.
At the outset, it must be acknowledged that there is considerable authority for the proposition that Rule 83 should not be
invoked in those areas already covered by other Federal Rules. In
Hughes Brothers v. Callanan Road Improvement Co.,139 for example, the court recognized its authority under Rule 83 to regulate
situations not provided for by the rules. However, it declined to
use that authority to compel production of a person for the taking
of a deposition on the ground that the party seeking discovery
could invoke the sanctions of Rule 37(d) and thus the situation
was already covered by the rules.140Similarly, many of the criticisms that have been leveled against the proliferation of local
rules,l4I particularly those rules directed a t predetermining the
138. This limitation is expressly made applicable both to the rulemaking and decisionmaking aspects of Rule 83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83.
It is also understood that rulemaking and decisionmaking under Rule 83 is invalid if
inconsistent with the Constitution or with an act of Congress. See Johnson v. Manhattan
Ry., 289 U.S. 479,503 (1933);Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629,635-36 (1924); Sanders v. Russell, 401 F.2d 241,244
supra note 58, § 3153, at 228 & n.54 (1973). It is
(5th Cir. 1968); 12 WRIGHT& MILLER,
difficult to imagine any statutory or constitutional norms which would be violated by a
district judge's decision to demand certification before allowing discovery to go forward.
It might be argued that implicit in congressional creation of the antitrust laws is a mandate that courts should not impede recovery on legitimate claims by interposing procedural obstacles, and that certification is thus inconsistent with the antitrust laws. By the
same token, however, Congress did not intend that the courts should be unduly permissive
in granting access to that remedy. And, in any event, certification does not ultimately
preclude a good faith claim.
139. 41 F.R.D. 450, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
140. Id. a t 452-53.
141. 12 WRIGHT
& MILLER,supra note 58, § 3152, a t 223 (1973); Local Federal Rules,
supra note 127, a t 1259; Local Rules Survey, supra note 135, at 1012.
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outcome of recurrent discovery disputes,142are in substance arguments that such local rulemaking is inconsistent in the weak
sense with the overall structure of the Federal Rules. The notion
is that the burgeoning number of local rules impairs the symmetry and flexibility of the federal system, encroaches upon areas
that were wisely left to sound judicial discretion under the rules,
and in general clutters the field within which the Federal Rules
were to operate unimpeded.
While weak inconsistency sets limits on the exercise of Rule
83 power, there is good reason to believe it does not bar a certification procedure based upon Rule 83. There are many situations in
which local rulemaking power has been exercised in areas covered
by the Federal Rules in ways that enhance the overall operation
of the federal procedural system. For example, local court rules
have been used in the discovery area to maximize the extent to
which the parties exercise private control of the discovery process.
One widely adopted rule requires that counsel confer in good faith
to resolve discovery disputes before a discovery motion will be
heard.143Properly invoked, the certification procedure would have
an analogous kind of ameliorative impact on the federal system.
Rule 83 has also been recognized as a basis for interstitial
judicial actions which are arguably inconsistent with federal procedure in the weak sense by virtue of their proximity to matters
specifically covered by particular rules, but which are important
if various contingencies left open by the rules are to be properly
handled. Thus, although Federal Rule 41(b) specifically covers
the issue of dismissal for want of prosecution and indicates that
it shall be allowed only upon the defendant's motion, it is well
settled t h a t a district court does not a c t in a manner
"inconsistent with . . . [the] Rules" in dismissing sua sponte an
action for lack of prosecution.144There are numerous examples in
which courts have sustained the exercise of Rule 83 power in areas
covered by other federal rules,145and there is no reason to believe
that the weak inconsistency obstacle could not be surmounted by
the certification procedure as well.
142. See 12 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note 58, $3154, at 237-38 (1973); Local Federal
Rules, supra note 127, at 1261-62.
143. See United States v. Carter Prods., Inc., 28 F.R.D. 373, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Local Rules Survey, supra note 135, at 1048. See also 12 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note
58, § 3154, at 237 (1973).
144. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962); Darlington v. StudebakerPackard Corp., 261 F.2d 903, 905 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 992 (1959); Hicks v.
Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 115 F.2d 406, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1940).
145. See generally Local Rules Survey, supra note 135.
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At a more general level, it is significant that the principal
arguments against judicial action that constitutes weak inconsistency all seem to be leveled a t problems peculiar to exercise of
the rulemaking power. The objections indicate a variety of concerns: that the flood of local rules tends to destroy the symmetry
of the federal system, that out-of-district lawyers may be easily
trapped by local procedural complication^,^^^ that some local
rules are adopted without sufficiently careful consideration,14' or
that litigation is forced into procrustean molds without adequate
sensitivity to the demands of individual cases.148But whatever
force these objections may have in narrowing the scope of rulemaking power under Rule 83, they are inapplicable to decisionmaking power in general, and to the exercise of decisionmaking
power to invoke a discovery certification procedure in particular.
To allow a judge to demand certification in an appropriate case
does not permanently introduce a formalistic rule into the procedure of a particular district; it simply gives added flexibility to
the manner in which a court can efficaciously and judiciously
supervise discovery in particular cases to avoid abuse.
A slightly different type of limitation on the exercise of Rule
83 power invalidates a local rule if it introduces basic procedural
innovations that are so sweeping in scope that they should
properly be left to the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court.
While this notion has been articulated as a separate ground of
invalidity, it can be thought of as a special instance of weak
inconsistency since it precludes changes that, though logically
consistent with the rules, amount to structural alteration of the
extant procedural terrain. This limitation on Rule 83 was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Miner v. Atlass. ld9 There the issue
was whether district courts could authorize the taking of discovery depositions by local rule pursuant to Admiralty Rule 44,
which was virtually identical to Federal Rule 83.150After rejecting
the contention that district courts may never pass local rules in
areas already dealt with in part by existing rules,151 the Court
146. 12 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note 58, 4 3152, at 219, 223 (1973).
147. See J. WEINSTEIN,
REFORM
OF COURTRULE-MAKING
PROCEDURES
133-34; 12
WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note 58, 4 3152, at 220 (1973).
148. See sources cited note 142 supra.
149. 363 U . S . 641 (1960).
150. Admiralty Rule 44 provided:
In suits in admiralty in all cases not provided for by these rules or by statute,
the district courts are to regulate their practice in such a manner as they deem
most expedient for the due administration of justice, provided the same are not
inconsistent with these rules.
151. 363 U.S. at 648-50. The Court stated: "[Tlhis Court's rules of admiralty prac-
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concluded that the exercise of rulemaking authority under the
particular circumstances was improper because such "basic procedural innovations [should] be introduced only after mature
consideration of informed opinion from all relevant quarters, with
all the opportunities for comprehensive and integrated treatment
which such consideration affords."152
In analyzing the nature of the limits thus imposed on local
rulemaking power, it is vital to understand just how radical the
innovation in Miner was. The taking of depositions, for discovery
purposes only, was a practice foreign to admiralty procedure and
had in fact been one of the most significant changes introduced
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the Court
was extremely reluctant to allow such a major change to be made
solely through local rulemaking. This was reinforced by the fact
that admiralty has always been a field of federal jurisdiction in
which "nationwide uniformity has . . . been highly esteemed."lS
The discovery certification procedure would be a substantially
less radical departure from existing practice under the rules than
was the authorization of discovery depositions in admiralty. Arguably, the procedure represents a less significant departure from
prior practice than some other innovations which the Miner Court
found permissibleP4The discovery certification procedure is simply a technique which can be used within the context of the
existing rules to assist a court in managing the discovery process
and preventing abuse.
Turning to the question of inconsistency in the strong sense,
a persuasive argument can be made that the certification procedure violates neither the spirit nor the letter of the Federal Rules.
To avoid the problems of "strong" inconsistency, the certification
procedure must comport with the notion of Rule 8 notice pleading
and be consonant with the generally liberal discovery policies of
the rules. 155
tice for the District Courts are not comprehensive codes regulating every detail of practice,
and we would be slow to hold that the interstices may not be the subject of appropriate
local regulation." Id. at 648. The Court then cataloged some examples of permissible local
rulemaking. Id. at 649; see, e.g., note 154 infra.
152. Id. at 650.
153. Id.
154. Id. a t 649 (local rule allowing a court to enter judgment on the uncontested
portion of a claim prior to trial on the disputed issues described as an allowable exercise
of Rule 83 power). ,
155. One could conceivably argue that a certification order is in effect an order to
submit a more particularized pleading, that it is thus a procedural device operating in a
field already regulated by Rule 8, and that it is therefore an instance of inconsistency in
the weak sense. Such an argument, however, reflects a misunderstanding of the distinction
between strong and weak inconsistency. Strong inconsistency will necessarily involve
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There are essentially two grounds for thinking that Rule 8
and certification may be inconsistent. The first is that insistence
on certification appears to circumvent Rule 8's disavowal of particularized pleadings. By requiring some factual specificity during
the early phase of litigation, certification appears to run directly
counter to the lax standards of notice pleading, and thereby to
collide with the mandate implicit in the Federal Rules that once
a pleading has met those standards, further factual elaboration
is to be obtained through discovery.lMThe second possible ground
for inconsistency derives from the fact that Rule 8 must be read
in conjunction with Rule 12(e), which allows a party to bring a
motion for a more definite statement. Originally, Rule 12(e) authorized a motion for a bill of particulars, but this provision was
deleted by an amendment in 1948. Certification might be objectionable, then, because it appears to reintroduce the old bill of
particulars that was expressly eliminated from the Federal Rules.
These potential sources of inconsistency will be discussed in
order.
Rule 8 provides that pleadings need only contain "a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief ';I5' that "[nlo technical forms of pleading . . .
are required";158and that "[all1 pleadings shall be so construed
as to do substantial justice."15gI t was designed to " 'discourage
battles over mere form of statement and to sweep away the needless controversies which the codes permitted that served either to
delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial
because of mistakes in statement.' "lBO Numerous decisions have
held that it is inappropriate to require higher standards for pleadings in special types of cases, including antitrust cases.lB1
procedural innovation in an area already covered by the rules but, unlike weak inconsistency, it involves not merely adding a new norm or device to the rules, but adding something that is contrary to their explicit or implicit mandate. Moreover, while there is some
analogy between a discovery certificate and a particularized pleading, it is more conceptually useful to think of the certificate as a procedural device intermediate between pleading and discovery but distinct from both. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
156. See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322-23 (2d Cir. 1957) (Clark, C.J.);
Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972, 978-79 (2d Cir. 1944).
157. FED.R. CN. P. 8(a)(2).
158. FED.R. CN. P. 8(e)(l).
159. FED.R. CIV. P. 8(f).
160. 5 WRIGHT& MILLER,supra note 58, § 1201, a t 58 n.11 (1969) (quoting Advisory
Committee's 1955 Report, Note on Rule 8(a)(2)).
161. George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp.,
554 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1977); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466,
472 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp.
v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1089-90
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In order to see why these considerations do not preclude basing a certification procedure on Rule 83, a number of points must
be made. At the outset, it must be remembered that a discovery
certificate is not merely a kind of particularized pleading, but
rather, a hybrid procedure intermediate between pleading and
discovery.lmA number of consequences flow from the recognition
of the intermediate status of the certification procedure. At the
very least, this recognition makes it clear that certification is not
the type of technical pleading done away with by Rule 8(e)(l).
More importantly, it emphasizes that the certification process is
not concerned with the "mere form of statement."163Certification
is essentially a holding measure that will ultimately "prevent a
party from having a trial"lU only if the party is utterly unable to
provide information from which a judge could reasonably infer
that there is good ground to allow discovery to go forward. Unlike
the special pleading practices Rule 8 was designed to eliminate,
certification does not create the risk that a party's claim may be
lost as a result of a technical misstep in verbal jousting. And
whereas experience with special pleading rules showed that they
tended to interpose delays without yielding any compensating
informational gains,16 certification is as likely to hasten as to
delay trial on the merits. While it may postpone the onset of
discovery, it compels sharper formulation of the issues and
thereby expedites handling of the particular case once the certificate is submitted. Moreover, it creates systemwide incentives for
better and earlier focusing of issues that should result in a net
efficiency gain for the entire system.
In addition to recognizing that the certification procedure is
distinguishable in significant ways from antiquated "special
pleadings," it is important to remember that some degree of fac--

-

(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Control Data Corp. v. IBM, 421 F.2d
323, 326 (8th Cir. 1970); New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881,
883 (10th Cir. 1957);Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322-24 (2d Cir. 1957);Broyer
v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see Clark, Special Pleading
in the "Big Case", 21 F.R.D. 45,48 (1957). Cf. Fulton Co. v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc., 54 F.R.D.
604, 609 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (antitrust action complaint must state a claim for relief with
clarity but need not set forth a detailed history of the parties' relations or include details
of an evidentiary nature, conclusory allegations, or analogous references); Karlinsky v.
New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 937, 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (in an antitrust suit
"that involves difficult questions of fact and law, as well as public issues, it is absolutely
necessary that [the action] commence with a complaint that is in fact a short, plain and
concise statement of the material facts").
162. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
163. See Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1957).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 322-25 & n.3; Clark, supra note 161, a t 54.

2991

DISCOVERY CERTIFICATION

337

tual specificity is required even under the liberalized pleading
policies of Rule 8. A party is still required "to disclose adequate
information regarding the basis of his claim for relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is entitled
to it?" The leading Supreme Court pronouncement on the
pleading standard imposed by Rule 8 states that a pleading must
give the opposing party "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests."lWWhat constitutes "fair
notice" may of course vary with the complexity of a case. As
stated by the court in Kirihara u. Bendix Corp.,la "in potentially
complex cases, particularly in cases involving violations of the
antitrust laws, the plaintiff should go beyond the 'short' requirements of Rule 8 if necessary to present a 'plain,' i.e., understandable and factual statement of the alleged antitrust violations."169
A bare statement of conspiracy or injury under the antitrust laws
without any supporting facts is insufficient.170Viewed in this
light, the demands of discovery certification appear to be consistent with the minimal "fair notice" requirement of Rule 8.
The preceding considerations explain to a large extent why
cases holding that special pleading standards should not be required in particular fields of litigation do not imply that discovery
certification is inconsistent with the Federal Rules. Generally,
these cases examine the issue of the appropriateness of special
pleading requirements in the context of a motion to dismiss.171
Subjecting a party to a sanction this draconian for failure to
comply with a heightened standard of pleading conjures up memories of all the horrors of outmoded pleading practices. But certification carries no such stigma because it is not a pleading device
at all.172In addition, certification is likely to advance rather than
inhibit the resolution of disputed issues on the merits by clarify166. 5 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note 58, § 1202, at 64 (1969).
167. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
168. 306 F. Supp. 72 (D. Hawaii 1969).
169. Id. a t 76.
170. Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100
(2d Cir. 1972).
171. See, e.g., George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix
Corp., 554 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San
Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thompson, 250
F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1957); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957); Broyer v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 415 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fulton Co. v. Beaird-Poulan, Inc.,
54 F.R.D. 604 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Karlinsky v. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
937 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
172. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
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ing what those issues are. Furthermore, a certification order's
demand for more particularized information should not be conceived of as creating de facto a heightened standard of specificity
in factual allegations. Rather, it should be understood as a recognition that the uniform standard of fair notice may demand
greater specificity in an unusually complex case than in conventional litigation.
The second possible source of inconsistency stems from the
seeming similarity of certification with the long-since jettisoned
motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 12(e). Prior to 1948,
Rule 12(e) allowed such a motion to be addressed to any matter
that was not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity
to enable the moving party to draft a responsive pleading or prepare for trial.173This portion of Rule 12(e) was dropped after it
became apparent that the availability of this motion created
needless uncertainty as to the standard of "plainness" required
by Rule 8. Additionally, a bill of particulars was not as effective
a means of compelling disclosure of evidence as di~c0very.l~~
While both certification and the former motion for a bill of particulars demand that a party who has filed a nebulous complaint
provide additional information to assist the opposing party in
comprehending the nature of the claim lodged against him, the
two procedures are distinguishable in important respects. Certification is available in a much narrower range of cases than the old
bill of particulars. Whereas a bill could be requested whenever a
matter was not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity, certification is proper in only a limited number of complex
cases where substantial risks of discovery abuse justify the imposition of some restraints. Thus, the kind of systemwide uncertainty as to when a pleading was sufficiently definite to withstand
l ~unlikely
~
to result from certifia motion for a bill of p a r t i c ~ l a r sis
cation. For a similar reason, the decision to order certification has
a rather different focus than the decision to require a bill of particulars. In the latter, the emphasis is on eliciting facts that will
clarify the nature of the dispute; whereas in the former, the focus
is on determining the existence of a genuine dispute before allowing the process of discovery to go forward. This difference is important because it reduces the likelihood that claims will be dismissed on grounds unrelated to the merits (i.e., nuisance value
-

173. 5 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note 58, § 1203, at 67 (1969).
174. See id. at 67-70.
175. See id. at 67-68.
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settlements). Furthermore, because the Rule 12(e) motion for a
bill of particulars examined the sufficiency of a pleading in the
context of a motion to dismiss, the granting of such motions inevitably created greater tensions with Rule 8 than the issuance of a
certification order. In sum, because of the pliability of the certification device, it is capable of fulfilling the particularizing aims
of the old Rule 12(e) device without creating the problems that
led to its demise.
Since certification's strong inconsistency with modern pleading rules is more apparent than real, the only remaining question
is its possible inconsistency with the liberality of the discovery
rules. No one would maintain that the discovery rules are to be
construed with such liberality that they create a license to impose
unlimited factfinding expenditures on an adversary. The rules
themselves provide for protective orders and similar devices designed to prevent such abuses.17' certification is merely a technique a court can use to prevent the unjustifiable imposition of
analogous costs at a stage in litigation too early for normal discovery remedies to come into play. Thus, far from being inconsistent
with liberal discovery policies, certification would help to finetune the balance already inherent in the Federal Rules between
open access to information and fairness in allocating discovery
burdens. Moreover, it must be remembered that the certification
procedure will not permanently forestall discovery so long as the
plaintiff is in a position to meet the minimal informational
threshold of the certification requirement.
There thus appear to be good grounds to believe that certification is not inconsistent in the strong sense with the liberality
of the discovery rules. This is particularly true in light of the
emerging tendency for judges to take a tougher stand in administering discovery to prevent abuses.177Far from being inconsistent
with the discovery scheme of the Federal Rules, the discovery
certification device, if used sensitively, can enhance the fairness
of the overall discovery system. It can ease the process of clarifying issues in complex cases, thereby facilitating the management
of the discovery process and encouraging resolution of disputes on
the merits. It is a procedural device substantially less harsh in its
effect than many of the rules or decisions that have been laid
176. See, e.g., FED.R. CIV. P. 26(c). See also notes 114-25 and accompanying text
supra.
177. Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery
Sanctions, 91 HAW. L. REV. 1033, 1044-45 (1978). See also SCM Societa Commerciale
S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 112 (N.D. Tex.1976).
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down pursuant to Rule 83,1T8and constitutes an arguably less
significant divergence from the overall federal rule system than
many other changes made pursuant to Rule 83 that have been
s ~ s t a i n e d . ~ ~83,
~ uthen,
l e constitutes another basis upon which
a district court could issue a certification order.

C.

The Inherent Power of a Court to Control the Proceedings
Before It

Even if there were not a sufficient basis for certification in
the Federal Rules, there is strong reason to conclude that a court
would be authorized to invoke such a procedure in appropriate
It has
cases by the use of its inherent power over its processes.180
been understood for centuries that once a court is vested with
jurisdiction, it necessarily acquires "judicial power commensurate with the jurisdiction conferred."181 All courts, federal and
state, have a broad and inherent power "over their own process,
to prevent abuse, oppression and injustice."182This power is "as
extensive and efficient as may be required by the necessity for
. . . [its] exercise,"183and embraces a court's jurisdiction to control its proceedings and the persons who come before it or affect
its dealings.184This power is typically referred to as "inherent
178. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (involuntary dismissal for
failure of counsel to appear a t a pretrial conference).
179. See Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Commerce, 360
F.2d 103,107-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966) (providing a method for service
on a foreign government); Hare v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 678, 686
(D. Md. 1972) (Rule 83 invoked to justify court order requiring amendment of a complaint
that failed to use separate counts as required by Rule 10(b)). Despite Rule 83's proscription of local rules inconsistent with the Federal Rules, there are many local rules in force
which appear to be in direct conflict with the general rules. The clearest examples are
found in the rules of the First Circuit, adopted pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 47, which parallels Rule 83. Several of those circuit rules state that the local
rule is to be followed "notwithstanding the provisions of" specified Federal Rules of
~ R. 8, 11(c). See 12 WRIGHT& MILLER,supra note 58,
Appellate Procedure. E.g., l s CIR.
8 3152, a t 219 & n.21 (1973). Many of these rules remain in force merely because counsel
are reluctant to challenge them and it would seldom be the case that their application
would result in reversible error. Id. a t 219; Local Federal Rules, supra note 127, a t 126364.
180. The Mountain View court relied upon the inherent power notion as one basis for
its decision to issue a certification order in that case. See Mountain View Pharmacy v.
Abbott Laboratories, No. C-77-0094 (D. Utah, Jan. 18, 1978) (judge's letter to all counsel).
181. 1 MOORE,supra note 68, 7 .60[6], a t 633 (2d ed. 1977).
182. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146 (1888); see 1 MOORE,supra note 68,
fi .60[6], a t 634 (2d ed. 1977).
183. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146 (1888).
184. Gold, Controlling Procedural A buses: The Role of Costs and Inherent Judicial
Authority, 9 OT~AWA
L. REV.44, 74 (1977).
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j u r i s d i c t i ~ n "or
~ ~"incidental
~
jurisdiction."lM As one author has
stated, "[ilt is an overriding, supervisory jurisdiction, enabling
the court to do what it must to maintain itself, its dignity, and
its powers free from abuse by those who would enlist its auspices
for purposes inconsistent with its own institutional interests and
goals. "
Because discovery certification is such a new device, there is
of course no direct precedent for employing a court's inherent
jurisdiction in this manner. However, there are numerous situations in which a court's inherent power has been applied to remedy abuses analogous to those which may arise in the discovery
context. For example, it is well settled that a court has power to
dismiss a claim shown to be fictitious, a sham,ls8or frivolous.18g
Similarly, it is generally understood that a court may dismiss
vexatious litigation.lgOOf course, it is seldom clear a t the outset
of an antitrust action whether some or all of the claims brought
against a particular defendant are fictitious or are brought merely
to escalate the litigation burden faced by a defendant, thus increasing settlement leverage with what is merely a vexatious
claim. However, if a court has inherent jurisdiction to dismiss a
claim which is fictitious, frivolous, or vexatious, there would seem
to be no reason why a court could not stay discovery long enough
to allow the plaintiff to certify as to facts that would show he is
making a good faith claim. After all, a court has inherent power
to stay actions pending before it,lgland there is likewise authority
185. Id.
186. 21 C.J.S. Courts $88 (1940). Gold, supra note 184, a t 74 n.169. Inherent jurisdiction is the
"reserve or fund of powers, a residual source of powers, which the court may
draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, and in particular to insure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent improper
vexation or oppression, and to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair
trial between them."
Id. at 74 (quoting Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 23 CURRENT
LEGAL
PROB.
23, 51 (1970)).
187. Gold, supra note 184, a t 74.
188. See, e.g., Cunha v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 34 Cal. App. 2d 383, 93 P.2d 572
(1939) and cases cited therein. In Cunha, the case was dismissed after the plaintiff was
given repeated opportunities to rebut affidavits filed by the defendants which refuted his
claims.
189. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Mason, 132 F. 245, 247 (1st Cir. 1904).
190. Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 286 Ill. 564,122 N.E. 55 (1919) (successive suits
by beneficiary against trustee); Scarcia v. United States Gypsum Co., 164 Misc. 825, 1
N.Y.S.2d 358 (1937); see Cunha v. Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank, 34 Cal. App. 2d 383, 93 P.2d
572 (1939).
191. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
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for the proposition that a court has jurisdiction "to control its own
process and proceedings [so] as not to produce hardship."lg2
Of particular relevance to the certification issue is the general principle that a court possesses inherent jurisdiction to stay
or dismiss proceedings in order to control and prevent abuse of
its orders, processes, and procedures.lM Two older cases exemplify
the litigation in this area and have strong relevance to discovery
abuses in the antitrust setting. Stewart v. Butlerlg4involved an
ejectment action brought by a purported heir who hoped to induce defendants "to buy their peace, rather than submit to vexatious and expensive litigation."lg5The plaintiff had a history of
bringing actions against the heirs of wealthy individuals, claiming that he was an heir and had been deprived of his inheritance.
In Stewart, the action was dismissed when it became clear the
plaintiff was unable to overcome charges that he had "brought
the action in bad faith and as a mere blackmailing scheme."lW
Houston v. City of San F r a n c i ~ c odealt
~ ~ with settlement extortion on a grander scale. In that case, a plaintiff brought an action
which named the city and county of San Francisco along with
approximately 15,000 residents as defendants. The plaintiff
claimed to be the rightful owner of a tract of land covering a large
part of the city and county, yet he made no effort to take the case
to court, where it would have suffered a speedy demise. Instead,
he approached unsuspecting land owners with his claim, which
was obviously designed to create doubt and uneasiness concerning the validity of titles, and offered to release his claim for a
modest sum. Justice Field, in describing the facts, indicated that
it was "notorious that . . . payment was obtained in a multitude
of instances."1g8Noting that this type of scheme was a blatant
"means of extorting moneys from the rightful possessors of the
property" and amounted to "little less than . . . r ~ b b e r y , " ~ ~ % ~ s tice Field promptly dismissed the case.
192. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110 (1921).
193. Gold, supra note 184, at 76. See, e.g., Bloniarz v. Roloson, 70 Cal. 2d 143, 146,
449 P.2d 221, 223, 74 Cal. Rptr. 285, 287 (1969); Arc Inv. Co. v. Tiffith, 164 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 853, 330 P.2d 305 (1958); State ex rel. Dillman v. Tedder, 123 Fla. 188, 199, 166
So. 590, 595 (1936); Ray v. Williams, 55 Fla. 723, 724, 46 So. 158, 159 (1908); Mahaffey v.
State, 87 Idaho 228, 232, 392 P.2d 279, 281 (1964).
194. 27 Misc. 708, 59 N.Y.S. 573 (1899).
195. Id. at 713, 59 N.Y.S. at 577.
196. Id.
197. 47 F. 337 (C.C.D. Cal. 1891) (Field, J.).
198. Id. at 339.
199. Id. at 340.
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To the extent that the threat of discovery in a modern antitrust action may become a form of "legalized blackmail," it
seems clear under the above cases that a court has inherent jurisdiction to invoke whatever procedures it deems necessary to avoid
such abuse. The inherent jurisdiction of a court-which is the
ultimate foundation of the contempt power,200is arguably sufficient to justify imposition of fines on negligent attorneys,201and
certainly be
supports the dismissal of spurious a~tions~~~-should
broad enough to allow a district judge to require certification
when he deems it necessary. Certification is tough enough to help
ferret out bad faith claims before heavy discovery costs and nuisance value settlements result, and yet sensitive enough to do
so without permanently prejudicing viable claims.

IV. IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CERTIFICATION
PROCEDURE
Having established that federal courts have ample authority
to condition the availability of discovery on compliance with a
certification order, it remains to analyze the factors which should
operate to limit judicial discretion in invoking the procedure.
Finally, we will examine the sanctions which could be invoked if
a certification order were ignored.

A. Limiting the Scope of Certification
Analysis of the various possible bases of authority for discovery certification has already established that there are some
built-in limits on the legitimate exercise of the certification device. Primarily, these limitations derive from the fact that certification in certain contexts could be inconsistent with the procedural regime of the Federal Rules. As implied by the discussion
of Rule 83, issuance of a certification order pursuant to that rule
would generally be inappropriate except in cases where the risk
of discovery abuse was high, since in the ordinary case it would
impair a plaintiff's right to liberal discovery once a pleading that
passed muster under Rule 8 had been filed.203Similarly, a court
would contravene the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15 if it
conditioned grant of leave to amend on compliance with a certifi200. Gold, supra note 184, at 76.
201. See Note, Civil Procedure-Power of Federal Courts to Discipline Attorneys for
Delay in Pre-trial Procedure, 38 NOTRE
DAMELAW.158 (1962). But see Gamble v. Pope &
Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
202. See notes 188-92 and accompanying text supra.
203. See notes 155-72 and accompanying text supra.
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cation order in circumstances where there were no grounds for
In general, the certification remedy should be
denial of leave.204
available only where there is some basis in the rules for its exercise, and application of the certification procedure in contravention of this threshold condition would constitute a clear abuse of
discretion.
Even after determining that the above inherent limits on
certification power have not been exceeded, however, the judge
must decide whether to exercise his discretion to invoke certification in a particular case. The central issue in this regard is
whether the potential for discovery abuse in the case is sufficiently great to justify overriding the normal assumption that
discovery should be allowed to proceed. As a practical matter, a
court must decide whether plaintiff's fears that certification
would cause needless delay and impose unfair obstacles on the
acquisition of information exclusively in the possession of the
defendant are outweighed by risks of settlement extortion and
related abuses. Analysis of these considerations will help assuage
plaintiff concerns and identify the factors that should guide judicial discretion in determining whether to require certification.
From a plaintiff's perspective, certification appears as simply one
more potential postponement in what is already an inevitably
protracted proceeding. But any delay caused by certification in
an action involving a bona fide claim can be eliminated if the
plaintiff simply drafts a complaint with sufficient specificity to
meet the certification challenge before it arises. Of course, if a
nebulous claims lacks foundation, a plaintiff can hardly argue
that he is prejudiced by delay. Moreover, a plaintiff cannot very
well maintain that expenditure of effort on its part to pinpoint
each party's involvement constitutes an undue burden when
plaintiff's costs are compared with the tremendous expenses that
must otherwise be borne by each of the defendants. And, of
course, if the request for certification were found to be groundless,
the defendant could be appropriately sanctioned.2u5
To the extent
that certification in a complex case helps focus the issues, it may
actually facilitate rather than delay prompt resolution of disputed issues. And even if certification does not speed the case of
the particular plaintiff, there is good reason to think it will expedite the processing of complex litigation in general, thereby benefiting the courts, other litigants seeking places on crowded calendars, and the public a t large.
204. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text supra.
205. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
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Perhaps the deepest concern from a plaintiffs standpoint is
that in the process of alleviating risks of discovery abuse, certification will provide defendants with a veil behind which damaging
information might remain concealed. There are two distinct dimensions of the problem of potential concealment. The first involves the risk of placing the plaintiff in a "Catch-22" situation
-requiring plaintiff to adduce additional information to justify
its claim before allowing discovery to proceed, while depriving it
of the means to gain such information.206The second involves
the risk that forcing the plaintiff to telegraph how much it already knows about a claim may simultaneously indicate how
little it knows, thereby allowing a defendant the opportunity to
secrete or destroy damaging information of which the plaintiff has
no inkling.
Of the two concealment issues, the second is probably less
serious as a practical matter. The disclosure by plaintiff of the
facts in his possession might well deprive him of a certain tactical
advantage. However, since elimination of surprise a t trial is one
of the main purposes of discovery,207it would be inconsistent for
the plaintiff to argue that he should be allowed to go forward with
discovery so that he may keep defendant from learning just "how
much" he "knows." He must therefore rely on the contention that
disclosure of facts in his possession would invite the defendants
to engage in the destruction of documents and obfuscation of the
discovery process.
Disclosure, however, would be unlikely to have this result.
First, the disclosure of enough facts to satisfy a certification procedure does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff has disclosed
all of the facts within its possession. Accordingly, certification
does not put the defendant in a position to second-guess the extent of the plaintiffs knowledge. Second, the destruction of any
documents or the withholding of information sought in discovery
is a dangerous tactic. It is extremely difficult to insure that the
other party will never learn about such destruction or retention
through copies, memoranda that refer to such documents, or even
the testimony of individuals who knew the documents existed or
participated in their destruction or withholding. Any possible
damage that could be inflicted by sensitive documents is greatly
outweighed by the prejudice done to the whole case by the revela206. Cf. Withrow & Larm, supra note 13, at 27 (referring to the difficulty of determining the extent to which issue definition should precede extensive discovery as a "chicken
and egg" problem).
207. 8 WRIGHT
& MILLER,
supra note 58, $ 2001, at 17 & n.16 (1970).
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tion of an attempt to suppress such information. In the postWatergate era, disapproval of attorneys who take ethical sabbaticals and the public's inherent suspicion of large organizations
demand that a corporation be extremely circumspect with its
document retention policies and that it be as liberal as possible
in the production of documents. Finally, the slow but steady hand
of a state bar disciplinary committee is always looming in the
background in the form of actions directed against attorneys implicated in document destruction or discovery obfuscation.20R
The most difficult problem in structuring an evenhanded
certification procedure is striking a proper balance between the
need to keep the doors of the judicial process open to plaintiffs
with meritorious claims and closing those doors to those who
exploit the present system to extort nuisance value settlements.
Achievement of such a balance necessarily depends upon the
sound exercise of judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis, but
certain factors may be identified to help guide such discretion.
As has been stressed throughout this Article, the certification
device should be invoked only in a narrow range of complex cases.
Generally, it would only be appropriate in those involving a significant number of parties and particularly nebulous allegations.
Certification is perhaps most likely to be appropriate in complex
cases where the initial pleadings are devoid of any allegations
actually tying each defendant into the claims averred. In addition, a judge should consider the relative intrusiveness of potential discovery. Where a claim is likely to spawn discovery requests
that will send a dragnet through a defendant's business records
and disrupt normal operations, there is a stronger call for certification than where a claim is made with sufficient specificity that
discovery requests can be more narrowly confined. A closely related factor is the extent of the disproportion between the likely
cost of early discovery to the respective parties. Still another
factor is the availability of pertinent information to the plaintiff
without discovery. A plaintiff should not be allowed to search
indiscriminately through all the information in the defendant's
possession when it has access to information which might narrow
the scope of its claim, thereby narrowing the range of needed
discovery, and lessening the burden on the defendant.
Vague conspiracy allegations pose a particularly sensitive
problem which a viable certification procedure must be able to
208. A lawyer would be subject to disciplinary action, for example, for concealing or
knowingly failing to disclose "that which he is required by law to reveal." ABA CODEOF
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
DR ?'-lO2(A)(3).
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handle. Because of the very nature of the covert activity involved,
discovery may be the only means of obtaining particulars to support the allegations. Often facts sufficient to establish a conspiracy claim crystalize only after bits of circumstantial evidence are
distilled from information obtained by extensive discovery. In a
somewhat analogous context, Professors Areeda and Turner caution against early foreclosure of
On the other hand,
the conspiracy count in an antitrust case is all too often merely a
stretch of boilerplate language thrown into a pleading as a catchall. Allowing plaintiffs to bootstrap their way into extensive discovery on the basis of conclusory conspiracy allegations may thus
be tantamount to tolerating discovery abuse.
The Portland Retail Druggists2l0case suggests that the certification procedure is flexible enough to deal with this problem.
There the effect of the certification order was to stay discovery
on the conspiracy claims while allowing discovery to go forward
on the substantive antitrust issues. Generally, if the conspiracy
existed a t all, discovery on substantive issues would be sufficient
to turn up either proof of conspiracy or information which would
suffice for compliance with a certification order. Used in this
manner, certification may constitute a useful discovery ordering
technique. A court may allow a plaintiff to "pry open the crypt"
in search of suspected conspiratorial conduct as soon as it can
certify a t least some hint of the corpse.
By scrupulously balancing the risks of delay and concealment against the potential for abuse, judicial discretion can steer
a sound middle course between the Scylla of undue discovery
limitations on plaintiffs and the Charybdis of spiraling discovery
burdens on innocent defendants. If used with appropriate restraint, the certification device promises to be a balanced and
sensitive device for eliminating blatant forms of discovery abuse
in complex cases.
209. In discussing the hesitancy with which a judge should approach granting summary judgment, Professors Areeda and Turner note .
that early disposition might prematurely save the defendant from the exposure
of his wrong. Many of the key facts are peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. The existence of a conspiracy, for example, will be hidden from the world;
knowledge can be expected to replace conjecture only after discovery. . . . And
motive or intent can only be speculated about in advance of discovery or trial.
2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST
LAW4 316, at 60 (1978).
210. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 71-543 (D. Ore.,
filed Aug. 6, 1971); see notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.

348

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

B. Sanctions
In the last analysis, certification can be expected to have a
salutary effect on the pretrial process only if the sanctions behind
it are strong enough to induce compliance and deter the types of
abuses it is designed to curtail. Generally, one would expect that
the mere fact a party cannot proceed with discovery until the
certification process is completed would be sufficient inducement
for compliance. In difficult cases, however, more stringent sanctions such as involuntary dismissal and imposition of costs and
attorneys' fees may be necessary. These constitute basic mechanisms with which the court may fashion a full range of measures
to deal with noncompliance. Therefore, it will be useful to examine the sources of authority for these sanctions before proceeding
to outline the ways in which a judge might match sanctions with
types of noncompliance.
1. Involuntary dismissal

The conditions governing involuntary dismissals are spelled
out in Rule 41(b), which provides that "[flor failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of
COUrt, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him."211Because of the severity of the dismissal
sanction, case law makes it clear that Rule 41(b) should be applied very sparingly.21zAt the same time, there is authority that,
despite the language of the rule, involuntary dismissal may be
ordered on the court's own motion.213
While there are numerous cases in which actions have been
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with orders
analogous to certification orders,214the ultimate availability of a
Rule 41(b) dismissal as a sanction in such situations is adequately
displayed in Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling
211. FED.R. CIV.P. 41(b).
212. J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318,
1324-25 (7th Cir. 1976); Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Comm'n, 442
F.2d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U S . 1039 (1972).
213. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U S . 626, 629-33 (1962); Darlington v. StudebakerPackard Corp., 261 F.2d 903,905 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U S . 992 (1959); Hicks v.
Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 115 F.2d 406, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1940).
214. See, e.g., Fendler v. Westgate-California Corp., 527 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1975)
(dismissed for failure to limit, as ordered, third amended complaint to explicitly stated
claims so as to clarify the nature of the action); Package Mach. Co. v. Hayssen Mfg. Co.,
266 F.2d 56,(7th Cir. 1959) (dismissed for failure to furnish more specific statement of
trade secrets allegedly pirated by defendants).
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wrestler brought an antitrust action alleging that the Portland Boxing & Wrestling Commission
and various other defendants had conspired to restrain trade in
the wrestling business. Approximately fourteen months after the
action was originally filed, the district judge requested the plaintiff to submit a detailed pretrial statement to help clarify the
issues.216In particular, the court wanted a statement identifying
with specificity what the conspiracy consisted of, a statement of
expected testimony, and a description of the role the various
parties had played in the alleged conspiracy.217After more than
a year of patient extensions and the submission of three statements that failed to comply with the request, the judge finally
In
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 4l(b) .218
explaining this decision, the judge stated he had given the plaintiff ample warning and " 'could not allow an antitrust case to
continue when it was based solely on suspicion.' "219
Von Poppenheim provides support by analogy for the proposition that Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there has
been repeated noncompliance with a certification order. Admittedly, the case is distinguishable from the typical situation in
which certification would be invoked, since the orders occurred
at a later stage of the proceeding than would be the case with a
certification order and discovery was never stayed. In Von
Poppenheim dismissal was arguably more justified because the
plaintiff, through discovery, a t least had access to the information required for the pretrial statement, if such information existed at all, whereas a certification order may completely preclude a party from seeking information through discovery channels pending adequate certification. But it must be remembered
that the quantum of information required in an adequate certificate is really quite small. A plaintiff may comply with a certification order merely by establishing that there is no way to get
access to certain information short of discovery.220The certifica215. 442 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972).
216. Id. a t 1049.
217. Id. a t 1050.
218. Id. a t 1051.
219. Id. a t 1052 (quoting the district court order).
One of the interesting points about the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of Von Poppenheim
is its suggestion that "less drastic alternatives should first be considered before dismissing
an action under Rule 41(b)." Id. at 1053. See also Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v.
Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (9th Cir. 1970). Significantly, certification
would constitute just such a "less drastic alternative" in many cases, since it can normally
induce party compliance without relying on the austere dismissal sanction.
220. See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
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tion procedure will thus bar discovery from going forward altogether only if the plaintiff is unable to persuade the district court
that there is some likelihood relevant material would emerge if
discovery were allowed. Accordingly, manifest inability to comply
with a certification order is arguably as good a basis for a Rule
41(b) dismissal as was repeated noncompliance with the order in
Von Poppenheim. As the Ninth Circuit emphasized in that case,
there comes a point a t which the "rights of the defendants to be
free from costly and harrassing litigation"221and limitations on
judicial time and energy outweigh the right of a would-be plaintiff
to maintain his action.222
2. Attorneys' fees and related expenses

While Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. u. Wilderness SocietyZn
reaffirmed the American rule that, absent specific statutory authority to the contrary, each party must bear its own counsel
expenses, the Court there explicitly recognized that "a court may
assess attorneys' fees . . . when the losing party has 'acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons . . . .' "224
This exception has typically been construed narrowlynr and applied only in egregious cases.226Because the quantum of information necessary to pass the certification threshold is so minimal,
however, there is a strong likelihood that, at least in some cases,
noncompliance with a certification order would involve "bad
faith" of sufficient magnitude to justify the imposition of this
sanction.
In the most extreme cases, it might be appropriate to tax
litigation expenses to the plaintiff's attorney. One possible basis
for this course is 28 U.S.C. 8 1927 which provides that: "[alny
attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to
increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by
-

-

221. 442 F.2d a t 1054.
222. Id.
223. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
224. Id. a t 258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)).
225. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1976); Adams v.
Carlson, 521 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1975).
226. E.g., McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st Cir. 1971) (assessment
of plaintiffs fees despite dismissal of action because plaintiff had to go to court to vindicate previously established constitutional right to a statement of reasons for nonrenewal
of contract by state college); Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963) (continued
pattern of evasion and obstruction with respect to school desegregation); Rolax v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951) (discriminatory and oppressive conduct by
labor union made individual suit by black workers necessary).
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the court to satisfy personally such excess costs."2n As originally
enacted this provision may have referred only to costs of court in
the narrow, traditional sense which does not include attorneys'
fees,lZ8but in recent years there has been some scholarly suggestion that its scope is broad enough to permit shifting more of the
litigation expense burden in suitable cases? As indicated by one
author, "when any person under the authority of the court takes
a position dishonestly or frivolously and expenses arise from that
~ also
action, that person should pay full c o m p e n ~ a t i o n . "It~ ~will
be recalled from the discussion of Rule 11 that a court imposed
expenses upon the attorney who derived his defendant list from
the Philadelphia telephone directory.231Where the attorney has
been instrumental in bringing a "bad faith" harassment action,
personal liability for resulting burdens upon others seems clearly
justified.
The recently proposed amendment of Rule 37(e) bears directly on the issue of awarding litigation expenses in appropriate
cases. The new subdivision would allow a court in its discretion
to "impose upon any party or counsel such sanctions as may be
just, including the payment of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees" for failure to cooperate in framing a discovery plan or
for abuse of the discovery process "in seeking, making or resisting
discovery."232The Advisory Committee recognized that while protective orders under Rule 26(c) and section 1927 sanctions are
available, they are seldom invoked. The Committee therefore
concluded that the proposed change was necessary "to make explicit the power of the court to impose sanctions for all forms of
discovery abuse."233Insofar as failure to provide a discovery certificate represents such an abuse, the new Rule 37(e), if adopted,
provides ample authority for shifting the burden of expenses
occasioned by filing of an action without adequate basis.
227. 28 U.S.C. 4 1927 (1970).
228. See Risinger, supra note 109, at 47-48. The section has consistently been so
applied. E.g., 1507 Corp. v. Henderson, 447 F.2d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 1971), and cases cited
therein.
229. See Risinger, supra note 109, at 47-51; Note, Civil Procedure-Power of Federal
Courts to Discipline Attorneys for Delay in Pre-trial Procedure, 38 NOTRE
DAME
LAW.158,
168-69 (1963); 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.947-48 (1962).
230. Risinger, supra note 109, at 51.
231. See Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 983
(E.D. Pa. 1973); notes 105-08 and accompanying text supra.
232. 1978 PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS,
supra note 6, at 35 (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
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3. Range and flexibility of sanctions

We can now summarize the possible sanctions for noncompliance with a certification order. The most severe sanction would
involve dismissing the action and requiring either the plaintiff or
his attorney to defray all expenses defendants incurred in defending the suit, including attorneys' fees. This burden could be
scaled down in appropriate circumstances by dismissing the action and awarding attorneys' fees and costs, but not other defense
expenses, and could be reduced still further by simply dismissing
the action and allocating court costs in accordance with conventional procedures. In certain cases, where it appears the attorney
has been operating in bad faith, but has filed a good cause of
action against a t least some defendants, it may be appropriate to
impose some or all of the foregoing expenses on the guilty attorney, without dismissing the underlying claim. I t is also conceivable that where a plaintiff's first certificate was inadequate but a
second was deemed sufficient, the court might impose on the
plaintiff the defendant's costs incurred in preparation for the
challenge to the first certificate. If a party did comply with a
certification order but the facts certified were ultimately proven
false, or the certification was made in bad faith, the plaintiff or
its counsel might be subject to perjury sanctions, or at a bare
minimum, to those provided by Rule 11. Assuming that facts
were certified in good faith, but plaintiffs allegations were later
determined to be without merit, it might still be appropriate in
certain circumstances for costs to be imposed in a manner that
would place the expenses of early discovery on the plaintiff. And
finally, as indicated at the outset, the mere deprivation of the
right to proceed with discovery would probably be sufficient sanction to insure adequate compliance with the certification procedure in most cases.
As the foregoing summary of possible sanctions makes clear,
a judge would have great flexibility in tailoring any sanctions
imposed to the needs and circumstances of particular cases. The
more drastic sanctions of dismissal and imposition of attorneys'
fees and other costs should be reserved for dealing with cases of
egregious noncompliance with a certification order and fairly blatant abuses of the federal procedural system. The determination
of whether various costs should be borne by a plaintiff or his
attorney would of course turn on where culpability for abuse lies.
A plaintiff with an arguably valid claim should not be prejudiced
by the m'alfeasance of his attorney unless the reality of the particular attorney-client relationship conforms to the legal theory that
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the attorney is merely an agent acting at the behest of his clientprincipal. The fact that an attorney had a reputation for or record
of bringing spurious suits might weigh in favor of imposing a
stiffer sanction.234In general, the sanctions applied in connection
with the certification procedure should be applied in a manner
which will avoid undue severity and ultimately facilitate moving
a case forward into the normal discovery track if the case warrants judicial disposition. However, where the certification identifies spurious claims, and particularly where a plaintiff's bad
faith continues through the certification process, sanctions
should be applied which will adequately compensate a defendant
for the effects of the objectionable tactics of the plaintiff or its
counsel.

One of the most notable difficulties with the initial applications of the certification procedure in Portland Retail Druggists
and Mountain View was the uncertainty of the judges in those
cases as to the legitimacy of the certification device. As a result,
an undue amount of time was spent puzzling about the court's
power to invoke what appeared to be a salutary procedural device. Our analysis has demonstrated that such judicial hesitancy
is needless. Assuming that one is faced with a case of sufficient
complexity, there are adequate grounds within the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the inherent power of a court to authorize
use of the certification device. Exercised with appropriate restraint, certification promises to be an effective tool for managing
discovery and curbing a limited but extremely egregious form of
discovery abuse. Normal discovery sanctions are often too harsh
or insufficiently flexible, hence judges become reluctant to invoke
them and abusive discovery goes unchecked. Because of its great
flexibility, certification can reach some of the abuses that often
slip past normal discovery sanctions and aid the court in managing the course of discovery. Postponing access to discovery
through certification is an appreciably milder sanction than others authorized by the Federal Rules, and its use will help to equalize early discovery burdens in complex cases. At a time when
judges are looking for mechanisms to assist them in controlling
discovery abuse, certification may thus be a particularly useful
device in appropriate cases.
234. Cf. AAA v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (judge ordered
filing for future reference the name of an attorney who knowingly put forth a groundless
claim).

